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ABSTRACT 
Real earnings management has attracted increasing attention in accounting 
research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
However, real earnings management has still received relatively light testing and 
inconsistency and conflicts exist in existing evidence in relation to real earnings 
management. In addition, as most of the existing studies on real earnings management 
focuses on testing large economies, such as in the U.S., these studies have failed to 
provide findings on real earnings management in an international context. Therefore, 
the objective of this thesis is to test firms’ real earnings management in different 
institutional environments and crisis periods, and the relationship between real earnings 
management activities and firms’ future performance.  
Utilising a sample of 135,722 firm-year observations for 31 countries from 1996 
to 2011, this thesis finds more income-increasing real earnings management 
behaviours in countries with a code-law tradition, a French-civil-law tradition, lower 
investor protection, lower law enforcement, and countries with more concentrated 
ownership. The results also show a significant negative association between firms’ 
real earnings management activities and firms’ future ROA (return on assets) and 
future CFO (cash flow from operations). And in terms of this negative impact of REM 
(real earnings management) on firms’ future cash generating ability, it is moderated by 
a stronger institutional environment. In addition, this thesis documents a negative 
association between REM and CRISIS. In regard to the results on the sub-components 
of REM, the result show that in crises, firms engage in sales manipulation and 
reduction of discretionary expenses to increase reported earnings. And the negative 
impacts of REM on firms’ future ROA and future CFO is found to reduce during 
crises.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and research questions 
Accounting has long been called the “language of business” because of its 
important role in processing and maintaining financial information for a business.  The 
primary focus of financial reporting is providing stakeholders with information about an 
enterprise’s performance and helping users of accounting information to make informed 
decisions. Accounting earnings and its components are particularly important for 
stakeholders to measure firms’ performance and to predict firms’ future operating cash 
flows (hereafter CFO) (Comiskey & Mulford, 1986; Dechow, Kothari,& Watts, 
1998).Although flexibility in accounting allows managers to provide relevant and 
reliable accounting information to assist stakeholders to assess firms’ performance and 
to keep pace with business innovations, it creates opportunities for managers to carry 
out earnings management in an opportunistic way (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999).  
Examples of accrual-based earnings management include the manipulation of 
expected lives and salvage values of long-term assets, deferred taxes, and opportunistic 
choices among accounting methods, such as depreciation methods and inventory 
valuation methods, to report transactions. The main reason that accrual-based earnings 
management has been so pervasive during the last few decades is that manipulating 
accrual earnings can be convenient as it is difficult to detect and the opportunities to do 
so are provided by GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) (Levitt, 1998).  
Managers can manipulate reported income through accounting estimates and 
methods and also through real operational decisions (hereafter real earnings 
management or REM). To manipulate reported accounting earnings, real earnings 
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management usually involves decisions that affect the timing or structuring of business 
transactions (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005). In particular, income-increasing real earnings 
management can include changing inventory levels and timing of inventory shipments 
or purchases, managing expenditures such as research and development (R&D), 
maintenance, and advertising, selling fixed assets, giving sales discounts, and 
over-producing to reduce overall manufacturing costs assigned to the current period 
(Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Xu, Taylor, & Dugan, 2007). In the main tests of this thesis, I 
examine earnings manipulation through three operating activities:   
1. Sales manipulation  
2. Manipulation of discretionary expenditures  
3. Over production to report lower COGS (Cost of Goods Sold) 
The research interest of this thesis covers firms’ real earnings management 
behaviours in different circumstances. In particular, the thesis aims to investigate the 
research question of if firms’ real earnings management behaviours are associated with 
the institutional environment in their home countries. The institutional environment was 
previously measured using factors such as legal tradition, shareholder protection, law 
enforcement and ownership concentration. In addition, this thesis tests the research 
question of whether real earnings management activities have negative impacts on firms’ 
future profit and cash flow generating abilities. This research question is motivated by 
the inability to identify if real earnings management activities are efficient or 
opportunistic decision makings. Moreover, the research question of how firms’ real 
earnings management behaviours change during financial crisis will be tested in this 
thesis. The motivation behind these three research questions will be discussed in more 
details in the next section.  
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1.2 Motivation for the research 
The insufficient and somewhat conflicting findings in the real earnings management 
studies form strong motivation for testing the research questions in this research. 
Research studies on real earnings management are still very limited and focus on only a 
few topics, such as evidence in terms of firms’ manipulation of real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses (Roychowdhury, 2006), the changes of real earnings 
management behaviours especially as against the use of accrual-based earnings 
management (Cohen, Dy, & Lys, 2008; Zang, 2012), and the consequences of real 
earnings management (Gunny, 2010; Taylor & Xu, 2010), and using data mainly from 
the U.S.. This thesis is motivated by the lack of research on real earnings management 
in specific contexts, as shown in Figure 1.1 below, including three research areas.  
 
Figure 1.1: The scope of this thesis 
 
It is meaningful to conduct international comparative research to address the issue 
regarding whether particular country level characteristics exist that could explain the 
extent to which firms choose to engage in a particular form of earnings management. 
REM 
International context 
Crisis context 
Impact on future 
performance and 
CFO 
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Legal traditions and legal environment, for example, can influence a country’s ability to 
adapt to commercial, legal and economic changes and crisis (Levine and Ahmed, 1998; 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2003; Johnsen, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000; 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen, 2003
1
). Such abilities are essential to 
evaluate or assess the way each country develops its accounting standards, protects 
investors, and regulates reporting standards, which are critical determinants for the 
pervasiveness and severity of earnings management activities.  
Earnings management, especially accrual based earnings management, has already 
been examined in many international-based accounting studies. For instance, Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examine systematic differences in earnings management 
across 31 countries and document that accrual-based earnings management is expected 
to decrease with higher investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ 
ability to acquire private control benefits. However, most of the international-based 
accounting studies have focused on examining accrual-based earnings management and 
hence fail to report evidence on real earnings management from the perspective of an 
international context, which can have important implications for regulators around the 
world.  
In addition, most existing studies on real earnings management collect data from 
the U.S. market while only a small number of research studies have examined real 
earnings management in other countries. For example, Black, Sellers, & Manly (1998) 
                                                     
1
 The findings of Levine and Ahmed (1998) indicate that countries where the legal system emphasizes 
creditor rights and has strong law enforcement have better-developed banks, which are essential when 
countries experience economic and financial challenges. Beck et al. (2003) claim that legal origin matters 
for financial development of a country and legal origins differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to 
evolving economic conditions. Johnsen et al. (2000) tested the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and argued that 
measures of institutions, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the 
extent of depreciation and stock market decline better than standard macroeconomic measures. The 
authors argue that countries with weak legal systems are vulnerable to the effects of a sudden loss of 
investor confidence in the crisis period. In addition, Acemoglu et al. (2003) document a strong 
relationship between institutions and economic volatility or severe crisis over the postwar period. The 
literature again highlights the importance of examining the institutional environment due to its impact on 
firms’ decisions related to accounting choices and earnings management. 
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test real earnings management in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and 
find no evidence that firms use asset sales to smooth earnings in these countries where 
the accounting rules allow revaluation of the book value of long-term assets. Whereas 
Herrmann, Inoue, & Thomas (2003) document that Japanese firms use income from 
sales of fixed assets and stock investments to minimize the gap between management 
earnings forecasts and reported earnings. The limited evidence on firms’ real earnings 
management in different countries is conflicting, which sets forth the probability that 
institutional environment in different countries may have played a role in forming firms’ 
decision in earnings management choices. As a result, the first research area of this 
thesis is at an international level to test if there is an association between country-level 
institutional factors and firms’ real earnings management behaviour.  
Another research area for this thesis is to test firms’ real earnings management 
choices in relation to a specific crisis, which has not been directly tested before. 
Although there is evidence regarding firms’ accrual-based earnings management 
behaviour during crises, the evidence is mixed and conflicts to some extent. On one 
hand, there is the ‘big bath’ perspective that companies save up earnings for future 
periods by engaging in income-decreasing accrual-based earnings management in 
financial crises, to take advantage of government support and more tolerance for poor 
performance in crisis periods (Chia, Lapsley, & Lee, 2007; Habib, Bhuiyan, & Islam, 
2013). On the other hand, it is argued that managers may engage in income-increasing 
earnings management activity to meet earnings targets, to avoid violating lending 
covenants, to reduce pressure from stakeholders, and to preserve their reputation in 
crisis periods (Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell, & Goodacre, 2011; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994; Habib et al., 2013; Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Saleh & Ahmed, 2005).The lack of 
evidence with respect to firms’ real earnings management behaviour and the 
inconclusive findings related to firms’ accrual-based earnings management behaviours 
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in specific crisis context serves as the motivation of this thesis to investigate the 
association between firms’ real earnings management activities and financial crises.  
Finally, there is conflicting evidence in regard to the consequences or impact of real 
earnings management. On one hand, Cohen et al. (2008) argue that real earnings 
management is both difficult to detect and more costly to the firm than accrual 
manipulation. On the other hand, Gunny (2010) finds that managers do not appear to 
use real earnings management for opportunistic reasons because firms which engage in 
such earning manipulation are associated with better performance in the future after 
controlling for other relevant factors. The inconclusive evidence regarding the 
consequences of real earnings management is related to different views of earnings 
management, which are the informational perspective, efficient contracting perspective 
and the opportunistic perspective. If REM is found to have positive impacts on firms’ 
performance, the finding can provide supports for the informational perspective and 
efficient contracting perspective. Namely, the findings can be interpreted as that firms’ 
accounting choices through abnormal operational decisions were driven by the incentive 
to provide more accurate information reflecting true value of the firm and reducing 
agency costs between managers, shareholders and bondholders. On the other hand, the 
opportunistic view claims that managers use their discretion over accountings numbers 
to transfer wealth from other contracting parties to the manager (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1990). The finding of a negative impact of REM on firms’ future performance is in line 
with the opportunistic view in that managers may also use their discretion over 
operational activities to influence their accounting results. This thesis is therefore 
motivated to investigate the consequences of firms’ real earnings management activities, 
in specific international and crisis contexts. The findings can help in the understating of 
the circumstances under which real earnings management is used efficiently or 
opportunistically.  
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
7 
 
1.3 Contributions 
The findings of this research will make a significant contribution to the literature 
of real earnings management in an international context. The findings will fill the gap 
in terms of the prior literature which has for the most part tested real earnings 
management in the U.S.. This research involves testing a large sample of data from 31 
countries, including a good mix of common-law and code-law countries, developing 
and developed countries, and western and eastern countries. This research also 
incorporates important countries, such as China, into the sample, which was missing 
in many international earnings management studies. The findings of the research can 
contribute to the understanding of if country-level institutional differences contribute 
to real earnings management activities. This extends our understanding of earnings 
management activities after the evidences the relationship between institutional 
environments in different countries and firms’ accrual-based earnings management 
(Leuz et al., 2003). There has been a strong trend towards financial reporting 
harmonisation worldwide. However, the success of such a policy will depend to a 
great extent on the effectiveness of country-level institutional settings in terms of 
ensuring that high quality accounting information is provided. Since earnings 
management can be considered detrimental to financial reporting quality, the findings 
of this research will provide important implications for the successful harmonisation 
of financial reporting worldwide.  
This research also contributes to the broad literature of business cycle and 
earnings management decisions. The sample of this research covers a long period 
from 1996 to 2011, during which a series of economic fluctuations and prominent 
economic movements had taken place. However, no studies to date have tested the 
relationship between firms’ real earnings management behaviours and economic 
cycles. The findings of this thesis will fill the gap in the literature regarding whether 
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firms engage in more or less real earnings management in a financial crisis. The 
findings make great contribution to the literature as no prior studies have tested or 
reported firms’ real earnings management behaviours during a crisis. Such knowledge 
can be very helpful for regulators whilst developing monitoring mechanisms and 
supporting or subsidy policies in crises periods. Another implication of the findings is 
that firms’ real earnings management behaviours in a crisis can be driven by 
incentives to send signals about the true value and future profit generation ability of 
the firm and to reduce agency costs between insiders and external stakeholders. These 
findings could have important implications for policy makers as it is important to 
understand in what contexts real earnings management activities are sub-optimal, 
opportunistic, and value destroying.   
1.4 Methodology 
The data utilised to test the hypotheses are collected from the Wharton 
Compustat Global database, the World Bank database, and the World Economic 
Outlook database provided by IMF (International Monetary Fund). The final sample 
consists of 135,722 firm-year observations and 20,968 unique firms for 31 countries 
from 1996 to 2011. The sample year of 1996 is chosen because many data points are 
missing for years before 1995 from the Wharton Compustat Global database. 
 The thesis adopts the modified Jones (1991) model to compute discretionary 
accruals, which serves as a proxy for accrual-based earnings management. Real 
earnings management activities are measured using abnormal CFO, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs, which are computed following 
the method of Roychowdhury (2006).The regression models for testing different 
hypotheses will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
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1.5 Findings 
 Overall, the results show the significant association between real earnings 
management and institutional environments, real earnings management and firms’ 
future performance, and real earnings management and crisis periods. All three 
hypotheses are supported by the multivariate analysis results.  
In particular, the results show a higher level of real earnings management 
activities in code-law countries, in countries with the French code-law tradition, in 
countries with weaker shareholder protection and law enforcement, and in countries 
with more concentrated ownership.  
 The test results also find a significant negative association between real earnings 
management and firms’ future ROA and future CFO. This negative association 
between REM and future CFO is reduced in countries with a common-law tradition, 
stronger law enforcement, and less concentrated ownership.  
 The results of this thesis also show significantly lower real earnings management 
in the periods of a crisis. To be specific, there are significantly higher abnormal CFO 
and abnormal discretionary expenses and significantly lower abnormal production 
costs in crisis periods. This is either consistent with the Big Bath hypothesis or with 
the efficiency proposition in that firms may face liquidity issues as well as stronger 
incentives to accumulate cash to safeguard against future investment needs. The 
results of this thesis also report that the negative association between real earnings 
management and firms’ future performance reduces during crisis periods, which 
provide some support for the efficiency or information hypothesis and the changes in 
real operation in crisis may not be opportunistic.  
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1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis will be organised as follows. Chapter 2 includes a detailed review of 
the literature related to earnings management, especially in terms of real earnings 
management. In particular, Chapter 2 reviews literature in relation to the definition of 
earnings management, accrual-based earnings management, different forms and 
techniques of real earnings management, consequences of real earnings management, 
in regard to the international evidence on earnings management, and in terms of the 
association between earnings management and financial crisis.  
Chapter 3 discusses the three hypotheses that are to be tested in this thesis. The 
first hypothesis tests the association between firms’ real earnings management and the 
country-level institutional factors. The second hypothesis examines the association 
between real earnings management activities and firms’ future performance. The third 
hypothesis investigates firms’ real earnings management behaviour during the periods 
of financial crisis.  
Chapter 4 provides a discussion on the research design and methodology used to 
test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. In particular, Chapter 4 discusses the data 
and sample selection process of this thesis, accrual-based and real earnings 
management measurements, and models for testing the three hypotheses.  
Chapter 5 is the results discussion chapter that starts with the discussion of the 
general characteristics of the sample as well as the results of the univariate analysis. 
The multivariate analysis results for testing the three hypotheses are then reported and 
discussed followed by a number of additional and robustness tests.  
The conclusion chapter, Chapter 6, provides a summary of the literature, 
hypotheses, research methods, and the findings of the tests and the implications of the 
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findings. The limitations of the research will be discussed in this chapter, which also 
includes a discussion on future research areas.   
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction  
Researchers have tested a wide range of topics on earnings management, such as 
different techniques or types of earnings management, managers’ incentives to engage 
in earning management, the reasons managers prefer a particular earnings management 
technique, how firms’ choices among different earnings management techniques have 
changed under different circumstances, relationship between institutional factors and 
earnings management, and the relationship between crisis and earnings management. 
And real earnings management has attracted increasing attention in the field of 
accounting research. This chapter aims to bring evidence from relevant literature to 
form a strong theoretical foundation to support the development of the hypotheses in the 
next chapter. 
Section 2.2 reviews the literature on the definitions of accrual-based and real 
earnings management. Section 2.3 will briefly discuss evidence on accrual-based 
earnings management and the reasons managers decide to engage in accrual-based 
earnings management. Section 2.4 reviews evidence on different forms and techniques 
of real earnings management that are used by firms to influence reported earnings in 
different circumstances. Following this, section 2.5 discusses literature on the 
consequences of earnings management which is then followed by a discussion of 
earnings management in an international context in section 2.6. Section 2.7 reviews the 
literature on the association between earnings management and financial crisis. This 
chapter is summarised in section 2.8. 
2.2 Definitions of earnings management 
Accounting is used as tools for firms to communicate important internal 
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information to external stakeholders, who rely on such information to evaluate the 
performance of the firms and to make informed decisions. Discretions to how 
accounting information can be reported are given to managers in a way to best and most 
efficiently reflect firms’ performance and value within the requirements of the 
accounting standards. And whilst these discretions may not always be used in the way to 
accurately present firm values, they can be used for opportunistic reasons, raising the 
issue of earnings management. 
This concern regarding the opportunistic reporting of accounting information has 
been raised in many early accounting studies. As stated in Canning (1929, p.98) 
“What is set out as a measure of net income can never be supposed to be a fact in 
any sense at all except that it is the figure that results when the accountant has finished 
applying the procedures which he adopts.” 
Consistently, Ball and Brown (1968, p.160) comment that income is “defined only 
as the result of the application of a set of procedures to a set of events with no other 
definitive substantive meaning at all”.  
To some extent, earnings management can be seen as a product of the implication 
of strategies that solve the agency problems between stakeholders and managers (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). For example, shareholders want managers to maximise stock prices, 
and in some way this is positively related to earnings. Therefore, shareholders design 
performance measurement systems and compensation contracts in ways that link 
managers’ compensation to the accounting numbers of the firm. Although such contracts 
are essential for reducing agency costs and measuring managers’ performance, they 
induce incentives for the managers of a company to intentionally manipulate the 
company’s earnings to meet a certain earnings target or to perhaps mislead certain 
stakeholders (Dye, 1988; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Trueman 
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& Titman, 1988). A more detailed discussion regarding accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management as well as relevant evidence from the 
literature will be discussed in the following sections.  
Schipper (1989, p.92) defines earnings management as: 
“A purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain [as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process]… Under this definition, earnings management could occur in 
any part of the external disclosure process, and could take a number of forms. A minor 
extension of this definition would encompass ‘real’ earnings management, 
accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions to alter reported earnings or 
some subset of it”. 
Similarly, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) provide the following definition for 
earnings management: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
Whereas from the above definitions, earnings management involves accounting 
practices that follow the accounting standards and rules, in essence it can deviate from 
the spirit of these rules. The definitions highlight some important incentives for 
managers to engage in earnings management, either accrual-based or real earnings 
management, such as an incentive to obtain private gains, to mislead stakeholders, and 
to influence contractual outcomes. The above definitions also highlight two earnings 
management approaches, including accrual-based earnings management and earnings 
management through real operational activities. 
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2.3 Accrual-based earnings management 
Accruals are components of accounting earnings that do not have immediate cash 
flow consequences in a particular reporting period because sometimes cash flows do not 
occur contemporaneously with the business activities. Managers usually have a lot of 
discretion over accounting judgments in regard to accruals, such as discretions in 
estimating the expected lives and salvage values of long-term assets, deferred taxes, and 
losses from bad debts, and in selecting inventory valuation and depreciation method, 
such as LIFO, FIFO, or weighted-average methods or straight-line or accelerated 
depreciation methods (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The use of accruals to temporarily boost 
or drag down earnings is a well documented mechanism for earnings management 
through which firms achieve certain market and contractual incentives (Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney, 1995).  
2.3.1 Capital market transactions and accrual-based earnings management 
Firms have incentives to manage reported earnings through manipulating accruals, 
especially around certain capital market transactions, in order to boost stock 
performance since financial information is often used by external investors and analysts 
to value stocks. Examples of such capital market transactions include management 
buyout, equity offerings and mergers and acquisitions.  
DeAngelo (1988) claims that managers have an incentive to manage earnings 
downwards through manipulating accruals prior to management buyouts since earnings 
information is important for valuation in the buyouts. Similarly, Perry and Williams 
(1994) document evidence in relation to income-decreasing accrual-based earnings 
management prior to management buyout. Following DeAngelo (1988), Wu (1997) 
examines earnings manipulation in 87 management buyout cases between 1980 and 
1987 and found income-decreasing earnings management in the year before the 
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management buyouts. The author comments that the preannouncement declines in 
earnings are specific to management buyouts and the potential benefit from earnings 
manipulation is estimated to be almost $50 million on average for the sample firms. A 
more recent study, Hafzalla (2009) finds that managers involved in their firms’ 
management buyouts make pessimistic discretionary disclosures, such as bad news 
disclosures and more pessimistic quotes, and manage earnings downwards before the 
buyouts transaction. As a result of the income-decreasing earnings management, 
managers are able to buyout their companies’ stock at a lower price as financial 
information is linked to the valuation of the companies.  
Different from management buyouts, managers have incentives to push stock 
prices up before equity offerings through income-increasing accrual-based earnings 
management. Firms are found to report income-increasing abnormal accruals prior to 
seasoned equity offerings (hereafter SEOs) and initial public offerings (hereafter IPOs) 
in order to benefit from higher proceeds from the offerings (Teoh,Welch, &Wong, 1998: 
DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik, 2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik, 2004, 
Schivakumar, 2000, Yoon & Miller, 2002, and Kim & Park, 2005)
2
. Although 
inconsistent evidence on the incentives of managers to manage earnings prior to equity 
offerings exists (for example, Teoh et al., 1998 and Schivakumar, 2000), it is well 
documented that managers do engage in income-increasing accrual-based earnings 
management before equity offerings and such earnings management has a positive 
impact on stock prices before the offering.   
                                                     
2
 Teoh et al. (1998) test earnings management around IPOs and report that issuers with usually high 
accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in three years thereafter. DuCharme et 
al. (2001) and DuCharme et al. (2004) also document accrual-based earnings management before IPOs 
and find a significant relationship between earnings management and subsequent firm stock returns and 
subsequent firm performance. And whereas the results of Shivakumar (2000) show that equity issuers’ 
earnings management may not be designed to mislead investors, rather it may merely reflect the issuers’ 
rational response to anticipated market behaviour at offering announcement. Yoon and Miller (2002) 
document earnings management prior to SEOs using a Korean sample. Using a sample of U.S. common 
stock offerings (excluding initial public offerings) between 1989 and 2000 Kim and Park (2005) find that 
SEO firms employ aggressive accounting decisions and push their offer prices up more aggressively in 
order to obtain higher proceeds from their offerings. 
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In addition, prior to initial public offers and seasoned equity offers, Erickson and 
Wang (1999) provide evidence that acquiring firms manage earnings upwards in the 
period prior to merger agreements. Their results also indicate that the degree of 
income-increasing earnings management is positively related to the relative size of the 
merger. Louis (2004) provides evidence that acquiring firms overstate their earnings in 
the quarter preceding a stock swap announcement. Alsharairi and Salama (2012) find 
significant evidence of upwards accrual-based earnings management prior to 
announcing merger and acquisition deals using a sample of US non-cash acquirers.  
2.3.2 Contractual relationships and accrual-based earnings management 
Leftwich (1983) determines that private lending agreements, which rely on 
accounting numbers, often deviate from the set of GAAP in order to reduce the possible 
conflict of interest between stockholders and bondholders. Later studies attempt to test 
the direct relationship between debt contracts and accrual-based earnings management 
and find that managers engage in accrual-based earnings management to satisfy 
requirements in lending contracts and to avoid debt covenant violations. In particular, 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) document the evidence of positive abnormal working 
capital accruals in the year of violation using a sample of 94 firms that reported debt 
covenant violations in the annual reports. The results of Jaggi and Lee (2002) show that 
managers of financially distressed firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals if 
they are able to obtain waivers for debt covenant violations and income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals if debt restructuring takes place or debts are renegotiated because 
waivers are denied. Anand (2013) tested a large sample of 193,803 firm-quarters, 8,804 
firms, and 2,035 new covenant violations from 1996 to 2007 and finds that although 
managers manage earnings upward in the quarters preceding a debt-covenant violation 
they manage downward in the quarter a violation occurs. The author also claims that 
managers manage earnings around the debt-covenant violation to improve their 
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bargaining power in the re-negotiation that follows the violation. 
Also, managers’ compensation contracts, such as bonuses and stock options plans, 
are commonly linked to the accounting numbers of the company to align the incentives 
of management and external stakeholders. From a compensation contracting aspect, 
managers are found to manipulate accounting estimates and choices in order to achieve 
earnings targets, such as positive earnings, increased earnings as compared to the prior 
year’s figure, and meeting analysts’ forecasts (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, & 
Sloan, 1995). There is evidence that managers manipulate earnings to maximise their 
short-term bonus plans, such as deferring income while the earnings target in their 
bonus plan could not be met and when they have reached the maximum bonuses limit 
permitted under the compensation plan (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Guidry, 
Leone, & Rock, 1999). Kasznik (1999) reports that firms in danger of falling short of 
management earnings forecast use abnormal accruals to manage earnings upwards. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) document that earnings management through 
discretionary accruals is more pronounced at firms wherein the CEO’s potential total 
compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. The authors 
also find that CEOs exercise unusually large numbers of options and sell large quantities 
of shares in years with high accruals.  
2.4 Real earnings management 
In addition to manipulating accounting choices and estimates, firms can also 
influence reported earnings through manipulating real business activities. In the survey 
conducted by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), 80 percent of survey participants 
report that they would decrease discretionary spending on research and development 
expenses (R&D), advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target, and 55.3 
percent of the respondents state that they would delay the launch of a new project to 
meet an earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value.  
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Roychowdhury (2006, p.337) provides the following definition for real earnings 
management: 
“Real activity manipulation is defined as departures from normal operational 
practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into 
believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of 
operations”. 
Based on these studies, an increasing number of recent earnings management 
studies, such as Cohen et al. (2008), Gunny (2010), Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee, and 
Soderstrom (2011), and Zang (2012), invested effort to document evidence on real 
earnings management. 
Extant literature has examined various forms of real earnings management through 
different operating activities, including controlling production, sales and inventory, 
selling of fixed assets, and managing discretionary expenditures such as R&D, and 
selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) (Xu et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
some studies examine real earnings management via investing and financing activities 
and find that firms smooth quarterly or annual earnings through share repurchases, stock 
option issues, and financial instruments
3
. This thesis will focus on examining real 
earnings management through operating activities, which will be reviewed in more 
detail in the followings sections. 
2.4.1 Discretionary expense 
There is evidence that firms manage reported earnings through controlling the level 
of discretionary expenses, such as research and development expenses (R&D) and 
selling, SGA, advertising, and health care costs (Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Regier ,1995; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006).  
                                                     
3
 See Barton (2001), Hand (1989), Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006), and Matsunaga (1995). 
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Since the future benefits of investing in R&D are uncertain, R&D expenseis often 
required to be expensed at the time it is incurred. Therefore, managers have 
opportunities to manipulate earnings in the current accounting period by reducing 
investment in R&D in the current period, especially as investing in R&D does not result 
in a direct increase in the current period’s earnings. However, it is necessary to note that 
accounting rules and standards in different countries impose different requirements for 
reporting R&D. Whether R&D is required to be expensed or capitalised at the time it is 
incurred can have an important impact on managers’ choices to manage earnings 
through reducing R&D expenses.  
Baber and Fairfield (1991) employed a sample of 438 U.S. industrial firms with 
R&D expense greater than 1 percent of sales from 1977 to 1987 to test whether firms 
reduce R&D to increase earnings and meet earnings targets. Their findings illustrate that 
R&D spending is significantly reduced by firms to report positive or increasing earnings 
in the current period. Bushee (1998) documents similar results. Perry and Grinaker 
(1994) tested the unexpected R&D spending for 99 firms with large R&D expenditures 
from 1972 to 1990. They document that firms tend to cut R&D expenditures if their 
reported earnings do not meet analysts’ expectations. In addition, Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) investigate 405 manufacturing firms with large R&D spending from 1974 to 
1988 and find that CEOs in their final years of office spent less on R&D in order to 
improve earnings. Bange and De Bondt (1998) also tested a sample of 100 firms with 
large R&D spending between 1977 and 1986. The study reports earnings management 
behaviours of firms through adjusting R&D expenditures to minimise the anticipated 
gap between reported earnings and analysts’ forecast.  
Although evidence from early studies, such as the studies that are discussed above, 
are subject to limitations with small sample size and samples employing only firms with 
high R&D expenditures, their findings provide strong implications and foundations for 
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later work that investigates R&D expenditures and firms’ earnings management 
behaviours. Roychowdhury (2006) investigates abnormal discretionary expenses for 
17,338 firm years during 1987 to 2001 and finds results supporting the argument that 
firms reduce discretionary expenditures, such as R&D and SGA, to meet earnings 
targets and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Gunny (2010) also tests a large sample from 
1988 to 2000 and confirmed that firms manage R&D and SGA to boost earnings 
especially if they have constraints in their ability to inflate accruals. Eldenburg et al. 
(2011) test real earnings management behaviours of non-profit hospitals. The study 
documents that expenditures on non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities 
appear to decrease in hospitals with incentives to boost earnings in the short-term. These 
studies provide strong evidence that managers tend to reduce discretionary expenses, 
especially those that do not generate direct revenue, in order to increase reported 
earnings and to achieve certain earnings goals and targets.  
2.4.2 Production, sales and inventory 
The literature has investigated firms’ behaviour to influence earnings through 
acceleration of sales, overproduction, and alternations in shipment schedules. To be 
specific, firms can grant price discounts or more lenient credit terms to temporarily 
increase sales volumes. The rise in sales can increase accounting earnings in the current 
period. Firms can also increase production more than necessary to lower the overall 
costs of goods sold (COGS) (by effectively transferring a portion of fixed factory 
overheads into closing inventory valuation) and hence to boost earnings. Shipping of 
inventory can affect earnings, if revenue is recognised at the point the inventory is 
shipped out. Jackson and Wilcox (2000) document that managers grant sales price 
reductions in the fourth quarter to avoid reporting losses and decreases in earnings and 
sales. Roychowdhury (2006) tests the abnormal production costs and abnormal CFOs of 
17,338 firm years from 1987 to 2001. The study finds that firms manage earnings by 
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price discounts and overproduction to avoid reporting losses or to meet analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Cohen et al. (2008) and Gunny (2010) also find similar evidence that 
firms influence accounting earnings through controlling sales discounts and production 
levels.    
2.4.3 Selling of long-term assets 
Managers have control over the timing of assets’ sales and can temporarily boost 
earnings through disposal of assets. Bartov (1993) investigates 653 firms in the years 
between 1987 and 1989 and suggests that firms time their sales of long-term assets and 
investments in order to smooth earnings and mitigate the detrimental effects of possible 
debt covenant breaches. Black et al. (1998) test the association between income from 
sales of assets and change in current pre-tax earnings before including the effect of 
assets’ sales and find evidence that firms use asset sales to smooth earnings in Australia, 
New Zealand and the U.K. where the accounting rules allow revaluation of book value 
of long-term assets. Herrmann et al. (2003) also document evidence of Japanese firms 
managing earnings through sales of assets. However, the idea of employing sales of 
assets to increase earnings can be rather obvious and can be easily spotted by outsiders 
by perusing firms’ financial statements. Therefore, the effectiveness and pervasiveness 
of this particular real earnings activity can be considered questionable.  
2.4.4 Accrual-based earnings management versus real earnings management 
For decades, earnings management has been an important issue in the field of 
accounting research as well as for regulators. Real earnings management has attracted 
increasing attention in the field of accounting as an alternative to accrual-based earnings 
management. Accruals manipulation does not consume cash and is very convenient for 
managers although there is evidence that accruals reverse in future periods (Teoh et al., 
1998; DuCharme et al., 2001). Although the underlying incentives for firms to manage 
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earnings via real activities are similar to the motivations to engage in accrual earnings 
management
4
, executives may prefer to manage earnings through real activities rather 
than accruals for several reasons. Investing in a single earnings management technique 
alone is insufficient to explain firms’ earnings management behaviours and the effects 
of such behaviours. Studying both real and accrual-based earnings management enables 
a more complete understanding of firms’ earnings management choices and yields 
implications on the ways in which firms react to different situations in terms of 
switching between different earnings management techniques. 
First, as documented in a survey by Bruns and Merchant (1990), managers 
consider earnings management through real activities as more ethical and more 
acceptable than earnings management through accounting manipulations. For example, 
while 74 percent of managers from the survey consider overproduction at year end as 
ethical, only 5 percent of the sample consider managing short-term earnings by making 
small manipulations of accounting methods as ethical, and 76 percent of managers 
consider making large accounting manipulations as unethical or a serious infraction.  
Second, real earnings management draws less public attention and auditor scrutiny 
since managing earnings via real activities, such as giving sales discounts and 
overproduction, is more difficult for outsiders to detect. Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011) 
find that firms resort to real earnings management when their accrual discretions are 
constrained by higher quality auditors. Similarly, Alsharairi and Slama (2012) argue that 
creditors play crucial roles in monitoring the firm, which would increase the credibility 
of corporate reports and restrict the use of management's discretionary power to 
                                                     
4
 Holthausen (1990) examines the incentives behind earnings management and summarises and contrasts 
three most influential perspectives on accounting method choices – the information perspective, the 
efficient contracting view, and the opportunistic behaviour view. As discussed in earlier sections, 
executives may deliberately manipulate earnings for various reasons, such as achieving earnings targets, 
solving the problem of EPS (earnings per share) dilution due to stock options exercise, avoiding violating 
debt covenants, reducing regulatory costs and attracting more equity investment (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Xiong, 2006). 
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manipulate earnings prior to special business events such as mergers and acquisitions. 
The pressures from external monitors, such as auditors and creditors result in real 
earnings management becoming increasingly attractive. Furthermore, Roychowdhury 
(2006) argues that the realized shortfall between pre-managed earnings and the earnings 
target at year end can exceed the amount by which earnings can be increased by pure 
accrual manipulation. The study claims that this is possible because pure accrual 
manipulation is limited by GAAP and also by any accrual management in prior years. 
The above discussion implies that firms may engage in real earnings management if 
managers are short of accounting discretion. 
The incentive to manage earnings through real activities rather than accruals can 
also be induced from changes in regulatory environment. The high-profile corporate and 
accounting scandals in America, such as accounting fraud at WorldCom, Enron, Xerox, 
and Royal Ahold, raise concerns about the integrity of accounting information and the 
subsequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) placed financial reporting quality 
under greater public attention. Although there is evidence that strict accounting 
standards reduce earnings management (Cohen et al. 2008), SOX and increased public 
scrutiny might have only reduced accrual earnings management. Managers might have 
attempted to increase the use of costly real earnings management if they run out of 
accrual discretions (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005). Cohen et al. (2008) document that 
accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of 
SOX in 2002 and accrual earnings management declined significantly since then. 
Conversely, the level of real earnings management activities declined prior to SOX and 
increased significantly after the passage of SOX. They also find that firms that just 
achieved important earnings benchmarks use less accruals and more real earnings 
management after SOX when compared to similar firms before SOX. Anand (2013) 
studies firms’ earnings management around debt violations and reports evidence that the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act restrains managers from using accruals to stave off a violation. 
Zang (2012) documents that increasing scrutiny or constraints over accounting 
discretion may not eliminate earnings management activities, rather it may change 
managers’ priority of earnings management strategies to real earnings management. 
Enomoto, Kimura and Yamaguchi (2013) also tested the switch between real and 
accrual-based earnings management through comparing these earnings management 
behaviours across 38 countries. This international study finds firms’ real earnings 
management increases and accrual-based earnings management decreases in countries 
with stronger investor protection. The authors support the view that whilst strong 
investor protection restricts accrual-based earnings management, it induces a shift to 
REM.   
In summary, the literature has reported important findings on firms’ incentives to 
engage in real earnings management, especially in relation to accrual-based earnings 
management. In terms of the findings of Cohen et al. (2008) and Zang (2012) they show 
that firms use real and accrual-based earnings management and tend to switch to real 
earnings management if greater public scrutiny and stricter legislation exist. However, 
the events that these studies test, such as the passage of SOX, and the data the studies 
use are specific to the U.S.. This makes the findings difficult to be applied to other 
countries and settings wherein different regulatory events exist. There are also 
conflicting views on whether real and accrual-based earnings management are 
substitutes or complements.  
2.5 Consequences of real earnings management 
With respect to the literature in regard to the consequences of real earnings 
management, it is still rather limited and still only employs data from the U.S.. It is 
argued that real earnings management occurs if the manager undertakes transactions 
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that are inefficient from the firm’s perspective yet generate a desired profit or loss in the 
current period (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005). When firms engage in earnings 
management through manipulation of real business activities, they consume resources 
and deviate from the normal business practices. For example, R&D is argued to be 
extremely important to firms to innovate more efficient and effective ways of 
production and operation, develop new products and services that increase 
competitiveness, and hence enhance future cash flow and profitability (Seifert & 
Gonenc, 2011). R&D expenditures are also important for economic growth at an 
aggregated level (Goel & Ram, 1994; Corrado, Hulten & Sichel, 2009). 
The opposing proposition claims that real activity manipulation to improve firms’ 
financial performance and to avoid losses is not always sub-optimal or detrimental to 
firm value, especially if certain conditions require managers to make certain business 
decisions. Taylor and Xu (2010) investigate the impact of real earnings management to 
meet analyst forecasts regarding firms’ future performance and find that firms that 
manipulate their business operations to meet analyst earnings forecasts do not 
experience significant negative decline in their subsequent operating performance. 
Similarly, Gunny (2010) finds that real earnings management through reducing R&D, 
reducing SG&A expenses, and cutting prices to boost sales, and overproduction is 
associated with relatively better subsequent performance. Gunny’s results suggest that 
whereas engaging in REM is not opportunistic, it is consistent with the firm attaining 
current-period benefits that allow the firm to perform better in the future or with the 
signalling effect. 
2.6 International studies 
2.6.1 Legal regimes and quality of accounting information 
It is meaningful to conduct international comparative research to address the issue 
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of whether particular country level characteristics exist that could explain the extent to 
which firms choose to engage in earnings management. Legal regimes and institutional 
factors, for example, can influence a country’s ability to adapt to legal and economic 
changes and can affect the properties of the country’s accounting information (Bushman 
& Smith, 2001; Beck et al., 2003). Such abilities are essential to determine how each 
country develops its accounting standards, protect investors, and regulate reporting 
standards, which are critical determinants for the pervasiveness and severity of earnings 
management activities.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) test a sample of 49 
countries and find that countries with poorer investor protections, measured using the 
character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower 
capital markets. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) also examine 
institutional factors in 49 countries and find that in terms of legal protections for 
investors, common-law countries generally have the strongest legal protections and 
French-civil-law countries have the weakest legal protections. These studies and a 
number of subsequent studies
5
 have provided a number of measures of country-level or 
institutional factors, such as legal origin, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, law enforcement, 
shareholder rights, ownership concentration, and importance of equity market. These 
institutional measures are widely used in international comparison studies, including 
international earnings management studies.  
Accounting information produced in common law countries, such as the U.S., the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, is said to be of a higher quality 
than that produced in code law countries, such as Greece, Spain, Brazil, and France 
                                                     
5
Examples of important institutional factor analysis studies include La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1999)and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
CHAPTER 2: PRIOR LITERATURE 
26 
 
(Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ali and Hwang, 2000). The quality of accounting 
information in the common law system is argued to be higher because the system 
enforces rules and regulations aimed at protecting minority shareholders’ interests, 
which contribute to stronger equity markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
&Vishny, 2002). Higher investor protection in common law countries exists because the 
common law system adopts limited government interventions, restraints on government 
power, places emphasis on protecting individual rights and private property rights, 
enhances quality of contract enforcement, and builds a more independent judiciary that 
helps protect property rights  (La Porta et al., 1999). On the other hand, the civil law 
system enhances government control, emphasizes administrative power, and builds 
strong central control of banks (La Porta et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2000; Habib, 2007). 
The country’s financial development is found to influence the effectiveness of financial 
analysts as monitors of the quality of accounting information (Degeorge, Ding, Jeanjean, 
& Stolowy, 2013). 
Bushman and Smith (2001) argue that strong investor protection gives rise to high 
quality accounting information because stronger legal regimes arm investors with 
stronger legal rights, reducing information asymmetry and limiting the expropriation of 
investors by corporate insiders. The differences in the quality of accounting information 
driven by differences in institutional environment of different countries are recognized, 
which contributes to the strong trend of adopting an international accounting standard 
by different countries. As an example, International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) were adopted by European Union (EU) in 2005 to improve the quality of the 
accounting information disclosed and to ensure greater comparability and transparency 
of financial reporting (Habib, 2007; Iatridis & Dimitras, 2013). This policy change is 
argued to be the biggest change to financial reporting in Europe in 30 years 
(Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewsk, 2006). A number of studies have provided 
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evidence that forms the foundations for examining how accounting information and 
firms’ earnings management behaviours differ across countries due to legal and 
institutional factors. These studies will be discussed in more detail below.   
2.6.2 Legal regimes and earnings management 
Using institutional measures developed in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, and 
2000) and a large sample of 70,955 firm-year observations for the period from 1990 to 
1999 across 31 countries, Leuz et al. (2003) examine the relation between outside 
investor protection and accrual-based earnings management across countries. The study 
argues that insiders, such as managers and controlling shareholders, have incentives to 
use financial reporting discretion to overstate earnings in order to avoid outsider 
interference or breaching of contracts. Insiders also have an incentive to use their 
accounting discretion to create reserves for future periods by understating earnings in 
years of good performance (Leuz et al., 2003). Insiders in countries with weak investor 
protection and weak legal enforcement have greater private control benefits and 
stronger incentives to manipulate earnings because of less public scrutiny and legal 
punishment. The results of the study supports these propositions and shows an 
important link between legal institutions, private control benefits and the quality of 
accounting earnings reported to capital market participants. Consistent with Leuz et al. 
(2003), Memis and Ç etenak (2012) test 1507 firms from eight different emerging 
countries between 2008 and 2009 and document that the efficiency of the judicial 
system helps decrease earnings management incentives.  
Adopting the aggregated earnings management score from Leuz et al. (2003), 
DeFond, Hung and Trezevant (2007) identify structural factors in the financial reporting 
environment that can be employed to explain cross-country differences in the quality of 
accounting information. Using data from over 50,000 annual earnings announcements 
in 26 countries, the study finds higher earnings quality in countries with better enforced 
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insider trading laws and stronger investor protection institutions. Cahan, Liu, and Sun 
(2008) test firm-level data from 44 countries for 1993 to 2002 and find that managers in 
weak investor protection countries are more likely to use income smoothing techniques 
for opportunistic reasons while managers in strong investor protection countries are 
more likely to employ income smoothing techniques to convey their private information 
regarding future earnings. Such findings are consistent with the argument of Leuz et al. 
(2003) that earnings management decreases where investor protection increases. 
Also, Chih, Shen and Kang (2008) employ data from 46 countries between 1993 
and 2002 to test the extent to which financial characteristics and institutional variables 
have an impact on firms’ earnings management behaviours. The study documents 
consistent results with Leuz et al. (2003) that companies in countries that foster good 
governance, as measured by anti-director rights and legal enforcement, show 
considerably less tendency to smooth earnings. The study also finds that earnings 
management is lower in economies with large stock markets and dispersed ownership. 
Francis and Wang (2008) provide additional evidence on the joint effect of investor 
protection and Big 4 audits on accrual-based earnings management. The study tests a 
large sample of firms from 42 countries over the period 1994-2004 and document that 
whilst earnings quality is higher for countries with stronger investor protection, it is 
only for firms with Big 4 auditors.  
Using data from a particular industry, Shen and Chih (2005) examine earnings 
management of banks across 48 countries and find that banks in more than two-thirds of 
the 48 countries sampled are found to have managed their earnings. Shen and Chih 
(2005) document that stronger investor protection and greater transparency in 
accounting disclosure can reduce accrual-based earnings management. They also find 
that higher real GDP per capital is negatively associated with the degree of earnings 
management. Gupta, Khurana and Pereira (2008) find that short-term debts create an 
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incentive for borrowers to delay the recognition of bad news through earnings 
management. They suggest that this impact of short-term debt is especially strong in 
countries with weak legal regimes. There is also evidence of a significant link between 
cultural and cross-national differences in earnings management (Doupnik, 2008; Nabar 
& Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007). 
2.6.3 The lack of evidence on international real earnings management behaviours 
These international-based accounting studies have documented a strong 
relationship between country-level factors, such as investor protection and legal origin, 
and firms’ accrual-based earnings management behaviour. Most of the 
international-based studies have focused on examining accrual-based earnings 
management and hence fail to report important findings on real earnings management to 
assist regulators. Researchers have only started to examine firms’ real earnings 
management behaviours in an international context recently. Using a sample of over 
21,000 firms from 41 countries, Seifert and Gonenc (2011) find that managers in 
countries with strong creditor rights have more incentive to reduce cash flow risks and 
therefore limit expenditures on R&D. They also report that the negative effect of 
creditor rights on R&D expenditures is stronger for firms facing or near financial 
distress. A working paper by Choi, Kim, and Lee (2011) document that the intensity of 
real earnings management increases as legal regime strengthens. They also find that the 
relative intensity of real earnings management over accrual-based management 
increases with a stronger legal regime because more firms switch from accrual-based 
earnings management to real earnings management due to higher relative cost of 
accruals earnings management in those countries. However, the study addresses a 
relatively short sample period of 2000 to 2004, which may be insufficient for testing 
earnings management behaviours across many countries since different countries may 
be experiencing different cycles during the sample period.  
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Most existing studies on real earnings management collect data from the U.S. 
market. Only a small number of research studies have examined real earnings 
management in other countries, which makes it difficult to carry out international 
comparisons and to derive implications for regulatory reforms. For example, Black et al. 
(1998) tested a sample of 503 firm years in Australia and New Zealand and 696 firm 
years from U.K. during 1985 – 1995. The study finds no evidence that firms use asset 
sales to smooth earnings in Australia, New Zealand and U.K. where the accounting 
rules allow revaluation of book value of long-term assets. Hermann et al. (2003) tested 
3068 Japanese firm years during 1993 – 1997 to document that Japanese firms use 
income from sales of fixed assets and stock investments to minimize the gap between 
management earnings forecasts and reported earnings. However, the findings from these 
studies are difficult to generalise to other countries due to differences in institutional 
environment. Therefore, studies comparing real earnings management behaviours across 
countries using a longer sample period and a sample of a large number of countries can 
provide a valuable contribution to the earnings management literature.  
2.7 Earnings management and financial crisis 
2.7.1 Economic crisis and accounting 
There are many different definitions and classifications of a crisis because 
currently we still know far too little about the causes of a crisis and its consequences. It 
is believed that in a crisis, there are sharp drops in economic activity, which result in 
widespread changes in expectations about future economic prospects (Waymire & Basu, 
2011). Crisis often goes through the pre-crisis stage while asset prices are increasing 
and overshoot their fundamental values (the bubble stage), and the crisis stage whereas 
asset prices crash, currency crashes, and result in inflation crisis, banking crisis, and 
debt crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Waymire & Basu, 2011). Using the recent global 
economic and financial crisis as an example, the crisis stemmed from the bursting of a 
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real estate price bubble in the U.S. that was caused by low-interest-rate monetary 
policies and relaxation of lending requirements for sub-prime homebuyers (Rajan, 
2010).  
With regard to times of economic crisis, there are significant drops in economic 
activities that cause challenges for businesses and widespread changes in expectations 
about future economic prospects (Ribstein, 2003). For instance, the financial systems of 
many countries were damaged substantially by the recent economic and financial crisis 
and many influential investment banks and financial companies failed during the crisis. 
Lehman Brothers, for example, filed bankruptcy on September 14, 2008, making it the 
largest bankruptcy in history at $639 billion (Fairfax, 2009). Also, the unemployment 
rate of the U.S. increased to 8.5%, its highest level in the past twenty-five years, by 
March 2009 (Fairfax, 2009). The crisis spread into a global recession around 2008 and 
2009 and had devastating impacts on businesses, the economy, and the society of many 
countries, making studying crisis very valuable for providing evidence to support the 
development of policies to reduce the negative impacts of a crisis in the future.  
Since accounting plays an important role in providing information for investors 
and regulators to monitor and evaluate the performance of businesses and to capture the 
health of the markets and systems, weak accounting can be an important factor in the 
bursting of asset bubbles, and hence the occurrence of a crisis. It is argued that fair 
value accounting made the current crisis worse than it would have been otherwise 
because it encourages risk taking in expansions and asset liquidation in downturns 
(Allen and Carletti, 2008; Waymire and Basu, 2011). In addition, although Barth and 
Landsman (2010) claim that fair value accounting played little or no role in the financial 
crisis, the authors comment that the transparency of information associated with asset 
securitizations and derivatives likely were insufficient for investors to assess the values 
and riskiness of bank assets and liabilities. Accounting rules and systems directly 
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influence the disclosure of information in the financial industry and other industry, 
which are linked to the occurrence of a crisis. The recent economic and financial crisis 
also has revealed inadequacies of the accounting practices and has led to significant 
accounting reforms, such as the passage of new accounting regulations. For instance, 
the accounting system and the audit industry are argued to be insufficient in the recent 
crisis to identify any of the emerging banking crises (Hopwood, 2009).  
2.7.2 Evidence on economic crisis and accrual-based earnings management 
The literature regarding firms’ earnings management behaviours whilst they are in 
depressed positions or facing potential debt violations can provide useful knowledge on 
the way firms behave in crisis time. Firms are found to accelerate earnings when they 
are close to their lending covenants (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). This finding is 
consistent with managers’ incentive to manage earnings in order to meet targets and 
requirements in the debt covenant discussed in the previous sections. Sweeney (1994) 
finds that although covenant violators make income-increasing accounting changes, 
these typically take place after the violation, indicating the possibility that the changes 
were made to reduce the likelihood of future covenant violations. Sweeney (1994) 
thinks that it is possible that firms make changes in their operations and accounting 
policies in response to their financial difficulties. However, distressed firms that 
undertake debt renegotiation subsequent to debt covenant violation are found to adopt 
income-decreasing accruals during debt renegotiation (Saleh & Ahmed, 2005
6
). Jaggi 
and Lee’s (2002) findings show that firms with technical default but being successful in 
obtaining waivers for debt covenant violations have used income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. If waivers are denied or firms are restructuring their troubled 
debt, income-decreasing discretionary accruals are used. These results suggest that 
                                                     
6
Saleh and Ahmed (2005) use four established models for detecting discretionary accruals during the 
recent financial crisis in Malaysia and find that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is significantly 
negative during the year surrounding renegotiations with lenders. 
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managers use income-increasing discretionary accruals if technical default is due to 
temporary financial difficulties and the firm is in fact in a good financial condition. If 
financial distress is severe that leads to debt restructuring or firms are unable to obtain 
waivers, managers use income-decreasing discretionary accruals to highlight financial 
difficulties, so that they can negotiate better terms for debt contracts.  
There are a large number of studies which document accrual-based earnings 
management during a crisis period. However, the findings of these studies yield two 
theories regarding firms’ incentives to manage earnings during crisis since the studies 
document different directions for the accrual-based earnings management activities.  
On one hand, in financial crisis and economic recessions, businesses have more 
opportunities to receive support from the government and face less criticism for poor 
performance. A reduction in earnings can be viewed as acceptable and temporary in the 
period of a crisis as long as the company provides evidence that there is potential for 
improvement in the future. Supporting this view of earnings management in crisis 
periods, Lim and Matolcsy (1999) and Navissi (1999) argue that companies engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management to benefit from changes in government 
policies
7
. Saleh and Ahmed (2005) find that firms manipulate earnings downwards 
during debt renegotiation in Malaysia during the East Asian crisis years from 1997 to 
1998. Similarly, Chia et al. (2007) find that service-oriented companies engage in 
income decreasing earnings management during the Asian Financial Crisis. In addition, 
Habib et al. (2013) provide evidence on earnings management in the recent economic 
crisis. Using New Zealand data, the study documents that distressed firms engage in 
more income-decreasing earnings management activities during the recent global crisis.  
                                                     
7
 According to Lim and Matolcsy (1999), Australian firms manage earnings downwards to benefit from 
an improvement in the chances of obtaining approvals of requested price increase during price controls. 
Navissi (1999) finds that New Zealand manufacturing firms manipulate earnings downward to indicate 
financial difficulties during periods of general price inflation.  
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On the other hand, it is argued that managers may engage in income-increasing 
earnings management activity to preserve their reputation when the firms are suffering 
from poor earnings performance or serious financial distress in an economic recession 
(Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Habib et al., 2013). This is consistent with the claims that firms are 
more aggressive in reporting good news and delay recognition of bad news during 
financial crisis (less conservative and less timely in financial reporting) (Vichitsarawong, 
Eng, & Meek, 2010). During crisis, firms are under pressure to convey more positive 
information to investors to reduce the negative impact of the crisis and to other 
stakeholders, such as creditors and the government, to gain more opportunities for fund 
raising purposes and political purposes. Using Malaysian data during the 1997-1998 
period of economic crisis, Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011) find that Malaysian IPO 
companies exhibit a higher level of income-increasing earnings management during the 
crisis period than during the non-crisis period. Akindayomi (2012) also documents an 
instance of aggressive earnings management of Nigerian banks to increase reported 
earnings during the nation’s banking crisis of the 1990s. 
There is also evidence of accrual-based earnings management during crisis in 
many studies testing different countries and crisis periods. Gul, Srinidhi, and Shieh 
(2004) test the effect of financial downturn in Hong Kong on the accounting 
conservatism of Hong Kong firms and their findings indicate that financial downturns 
provide incentives to managers to use their discretions in reporting more aggressively 
than at times of relative financial prosperity. Choi et al. (2011) find that the loss of 
investor confidence and the increasing use of opportunistic earnings management that 
occurred during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 led to a significant decline in 
the information value of discretionary earnings component. In this study, the authors 
tested nine Asian countries, including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) 
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investigate earnings manipulation during the 2008 economic crisis and find that 
Portugal, Italy and Greece tend to engage in more earnings management as compared to 
Irish and Spain in order to improve their lower profitability and liquidity. 
In summary, the literature on earnings management and crisis provides important 
findings and implications for firms’ behaviours during crisis and financial difficulties. 
The choice of earnings management is often influenced by specific circumstances, such 
as the severity of financial distress of the firm. However, a lack of evidence on firms’ 
real earnings management behaviours during crisis or financial distress exists, possibly 
because the measures of real earnings management are still relatively new.  
2.8 Summary 
 This chapter reviews literature regarding real earnings management and forms 
theoretical foundations for developing the hypothesis for this thesis. There is a large 
literature on firms’ manipulation of accruals to increase or decrease earnings in order to 
achieve earnings target, influence stock performance, and maintain contractual 
relationships. As compared to accrual-based earnings management, real earnings 
management has only started to attract more empirical studies in recent years.  
The literature has tested different techniques of real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), managers’ choices between accrual-based and real earnings 
management techniques (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), the consequences of real 
earnings management (Gunny, 2010), institutional environment and earnings 
management (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000; Leuz et al. (2003), and 
evidence on accrual-based earnings management and crisis (Lim & Matolcsy, 1999; 
Navissi, 1999; Chia et al., 2007; Habib et al. 2013). However, many topics on real 
earnings management are still very lightly tested and much of the existing evidence 
related to real earnings management is inconsistent and somewhat conflicting.   
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on the findings from the accounting literature, this chapter discusses three 
hypotheses testing important issues related to real earnings management on a global 
scale. The first hypothesis aims to test the relationship between firms’ real earnings 
management behaviour and the country-level institutional characteristics. This 
hypothesis is motivated by the series of studies by La Porta et al.
8
 and Leuz et al. 
(2003), which find that country-level legal and institutional environments affect firms’ 
corporate governance and earnings management activities.  
Hypothesis 2 investigates the impact of real earnings management on firms’ future 
performance. This hypothesis is developed based on evidence reported in prior literature, 
such as Gunny (2010). Hypothesis 2also tests the incremental effects of institutional 
factors on the association between real earnings management and firms’ future ROA and 
cash flow. 
The third hypothesis aims to investigate firms’ real earnings management during 
the periods of financial crisis. The hypothesis will firstly be developed based on two 
views of earnings management behaviours in crises and financial distress context. Since 
there is little academic evidence directly related to firms’ real earnings management 
behaviours during crises, the different types of real earnings management activities, 
such as sales manipulation, management of discretionary expenses and over production 
will be investigated. Hypothesis 3 will also examine the incremental effects of a crisis 
on the association between firms’ real earnings management activities and firms’ future 
performance.  
                                                     
8
These studies include La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), La Porta et al. (1999), La Porta et al. 
(2000), La Porta et al. (2002), and La Porta et al. (2008). 
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Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 present discussions in relation to the three hypotheses. 
Section 3.5 summarises the hypotheses in a table format.  
3.2 Hypothesis 1: The association between country-level institutional factors and 
firms’ real earnings management behaviour 
This hypothesis investigates if there is an association between country-level 
institutional factors and firms’ real earnings management behaviours. Country-level 
institutional factors, such as legal origin, legal protections for minority investors, law 
enforcement, and ownership concentration, are argued to influence the properties of the 
country’s accounting information, and firms’ corporate governance and transparency 
(La Porta et al., 2000; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007). A number of La Porta et al.’s 
studies provide important fundamental measures and concepts that capture country-level 
institutional environments, such as legal origin, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, law enforcement, 
shareholder rights, ownership concentration, and importance of equity market. These 
institutional measures are widely used in international comparison studies, including 
international earnings management studies.  
Legal traditions are normally categorised into common law and civil/code law 
traditions. Further, civil law tradition is often classified into French, German, and 
Scandinavian regimes (La Porta et al., 2008). La Porta et al. (1998) find that 
common-law countries (originating in English law) generally have the strongest and 
French-civil-law countries the weakest legal protections of investors. In common-law 
countries as compared with code-law countries, there is a higher demand for 
information on organisational outcome because firms deal with investors at the arm’s 
length and accounting information plays a critical role in investors’ investment 
decisions (Ball et al., 2000). Accounting information produced in common law 
countries is said to be of higher quality than that produced in code law countries 
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because the common law system enforces rules and regulations aimed at protecting 
minority shareholders’ interests, which contribute to stronger equity markets (Ball et al., 
2000; Ali and Hwang, 2000; La Porta et al., 2002). As a result, it is expected that 
common-law countries would exhibit lower earnings management because of the higher 
quality of accounting information and shareholder protection, which is supported by the 
findings of Leuz et al. (2003). On the other hand, civil-law countries are found to be 
associated with a heavier hand of government ownership and potentially with adverse 
impacts on markets, such as greater corruption, larger unofficial economy, and higher 
unemployment (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 2008). The weaker investor 
protection in civil-law countries, as documented by La Porta et al.’s studies, gives more 
power to insiders and makes investors more vulnerable in such an institutional 
environment. A sizable volume of prior research has investigated the association 
between the accrual-based earnings management and institutional environments of 
different countries. However, I focus on firms’ real earnings management decisions 
because it is argued to be an important and possibly an increasingly important form of 
earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2005).  
Similar to accrual-based earnings management, firms’ real earnings management 
decisions and choices can be influenced by the institutional environments in which they 
operate. The more corruption and large unofficial economy make it more likely for 
organisations in code-law countries to use their discretions to make abnormal of 
suboptimal real business operation decisions for opportunistic reasons. On the other 
hand, the higher quality of accounting information in common-law countries affects not 
only the financial reports but also the belief and moral standards of firms in these 
countries to provide information that reflects the true performance of firms. As a result, 
firms would be less likely to make suboptimal or opportunistic decisions in real 
operations in order to influence the reported earnings which are provided to the external 
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stakeholders. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:  
H1A: Firms in code-law countries engage in more real earnings management 
activities than firms in common-law countries after controlling for the effects of 
accruals management.  
However, although researchers reported systematic differences in different legal 
traditions, it is argued that there has been a great deal of mutual influence and, in some 
areas, convergence in between common law and civil law traditions (La Porta et al., 
2008). Similarly, Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems and Singh (2009) report that legal 
origin explains only part of the pattern of change in the adoption of shareholder 
protection and civil-law systems were catching up with their counterparts in the 
common-law systems over time. In response to the concern that the use of common-law 
and code-law classification may have been too broad, a French-civil-law dummy 
variable is constructed to investigate if real earnings management behaviour is different 
in French-civil-law system as compared to other legal systems, providing additional 
support for Hypothesis 1A regarding the association between legal origin and firms’ real 
earnings management behaviours. This classification is used because the 
French-civil-law system has been found to have the weakest investor protection (La 
Porta et al., 1998), the worst quality of law enforcement (La Porta et al., 2000), and the 
French corporate governance is characterised by an interpenetration of kinship structure 
(family owners) and managerial bureaucracy (Coffee Jr, 1999). Such legal and 
institutional environment gives rise to more opportunities for opportunistic earnings 
management activities to expropriate outside investors.  
In terms of investor protection, La Porta et al. (1997) document that countries with 
poorer investor protections, measured by the character of legal rules and the quality of 
law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. La Porta et al. (2008) 
claim that stronger legal protection of outside investors limits the extent of 
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expropriation of outside investors by corporate insiders. Strong investor protection gives 
rise to high quality accounting information by arming investors with stronger legal 
rights and reducing information asymmetry (Bushman and Smith, 2011). Investors’ 
rights are also protected through legal enforcement, such as the enforcement of 
regulations and laws on accounting rules and disclosure rules. Without strong 
enforcements to protect shareholders’ rights, the insiders would not have much of a 
reason to repay the creditors or to distribute profits to shareholders (La Porta et al., 
2000). DeFond et al. (2007) document that annual earnings announcements are more 
informative in countries with better enforced insider trading laws. A number of studies 
test the firms’ accrual earnings management behaviour across different countries. Leuz 
et al. (2003) find that insiders in countries with weak investor protection and weak legal 
enforcement have greater private control benefits and stronger incentives to engage in 
accrual earnings management because of less public scrutiny and legal punishment. 
Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), Cahan et al. (2008), Chih et al. (2008), and Memis 
and Ç etenak (2012) document higher earnings management and lower earnings quality 
in countries with weak legal regime.  
Stronger shareholder protection and law enforcement promote stronger business 
ethics as well as the culture in the countries about how operational business decisions 
should be made as a way to provide information on firms’ value and future performance 
to external stakeholders. For example, with strong emphasises on the protection of 
minority shareholders, firms would be aware of that manipulating production levels to 
manipulate earnings is unethical and can be misleading for shareholders. Without strong 
shareholder protection and law enforcement, firms may consider such behaviour as 
ethical and normal and pay little attention on the impacts of such decision on accounting 
quality and on shareholders’ decision making. With the stronger legal protection and 
law enforcement, there is higher investor demand for high quality accounting 
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information, higher public scrutiny, and more negative consequences for the 
organisations if their opportunistic operational decisions to influence reported earnings 
are revealed. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1B: Firms in countries with weaker investor protection and law enforcement 
engage in more real earnings management activities than firms in countries with 
stronger investor protection and law enforcement after controlling for the effects of 
accruals management.  
Finally, as ownership concentration is argued to be related to investor protection 
(La Porta et al., 2000), it can influence the incentives and opportunities for earnings 
management. Ownership concentration is also related to legal tradition because a large 
number of firms in code-law countries are owned either by the state or by the families 
that founded or acquired the firms (La Porta et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2000). 
Family-controlled firms are typically managed by family members and the controlling 
shareholders also have nearly full control over the managers (Claessens, Djankov&. 
Lang 2000). As a result, insiders would have higher private benefits of control when 
there is concentrated ownership in firms, leading to higher incentives and more 
opportunities to expropriate outside investors. And because the concentrated 
organisations have strong control over the daily operations of the organisation, it is 
more convenient for them to engage in real activity manipulations. The concentration of 
decision making power can also lead to higher corruption and connections between 
organisations, which may also increase managers’ incentives to engage in real earnings 
management to achieve specific benefits and goals for themselves or for their partnered 
or networked businesses. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1C: Firms engage in more real earnings management activities in countries with 
more concentrated ownership than countries with less concentrated ownership after 
controlling for the effects of accruals management.  
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3.3 Hypothesis 2: The association between real earnings management and firms’ 
future performance in different institutional environment  
The importance of studying firms’ real earnings management behaviours is in the 
negative value-destroying effects of such behaviour. Real earnings management 
techniques such as delaying advertising expenditures or R&D costs might have negative 
long-term impacts on firms’ future competitiveness and performance. Graham et al.’s 
(2005) survey suggests that even the managers admit that they are willing to engage in 
real earnings management provided that the sacrifice to the firm is within an acceptable 
level. Cohen et al. (2008) argue that real earnings management is both difficult to detect 
and more costly to the firm than accrual manipulation. 
However, using the U.S. data from 1988 to 2002, Gunny (2010) finds that 
managers do not appear to use real earnings management for opportunistic reasons 
because firms which engage in such earning manipulation are associated with better 
performance in the future after controlling for other relevant factors. In a more recent 
study, Gunny and Zhang (2014) find that firms that just meet analyst forecasts with 
more patent citations have significantly better performance than firms with fewer patent 
citations, which is consistent with the signalling hypothesis. This is related to the 
information perspective of accounting introduced by Ball and Brown (1968),Beaver 
(1968), and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), which suggests that the use of accruals 
and other accounting method choices reflect managers’ expectation regarding the future 
cash flows of the firm. Based on this view, earnings management allows firms to better 
“signal” the future performance of the organisation to the market since managers 
presumably have superior information about their firm’s cash generating ability. 
Consistent with Gunny (2010) and also using data from the U.S., Taylor and Xu (2010) 
demonstrate that firms identified as conducting real earnings management activities do 
not experience a significant decline in subsequent operating performance. Zhao, Chen, 
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Zhang, and Davis (2012) find that although abnormal real activities in general are 
associated with weaker future performance, abnormal real activities intended to just 
meet earnings targets are associated with higher future performance.  
This contrary evidence triggers the need to understand the circumstances under 
which real earnings management is used efficiently or opportunistically. It is believed 
that international real earnings management evidence would provide some useful 
insights into this issue because country-level factors such as investor protection and 
legal enforcement are identified by prior studies to have been significantly associated 
with earnings management behaviours (for example, Leuz et al., 2003; DeFond et al., 
2007). For example, consistent with the accrual-based earnings management literature, 
it is possible that managers in countries with weak investor protection are likely to 
engage in REM for opportunistic reasons while managers in countries with strong 
investor protection are likely to engage in REM for efficiency reasons, which might 
partially explain Gunny’s (2010) findings using evidence from the U.S. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
H2: There is a significant association between REM and firms’ future performance 
and this association is moderated by institutional environment.  
3.4 Hypothesis 3: The association between crisis and firms’ real earnings 
management behaviour 
Hypothesis 3 investigates firms’ real earnings management activities during 
financial crises taking into account the potential influences of the country-level 
institutional environment. It is believed that in a crisis, the sharp drops in economic 
activities result in widespread changes in expectations about future economic prospects 
(Waymire & Basu, 2011). The poor macroeconomic environment negatively affects 
firms’ operating activities and firms may often experience large reduction in sales. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, in financial crisis and economic recessions, businesses have 
more opportunities to receive support from the government and face less criticism for 
poor performance. A reduction in earnings can be viewed as acceptable and temporary 
in the period of a crisis as long as the company provides evidence that there is potential 
for improvement in the future. Supporting this view of earnings management in crisis 
periods, it is argued that companies engage in income-decreasing earnings management 
in financial crises (Chia et al., 2007; Habib et al., 2013). Firms are also argued to 
engage in income-decreasing earnings management to benefit from changes in 
government policies (Lim & Matolcsy, 1999; Navissi, 1999) and to gain advantage in 
debt renegotiation during crisis periods (Saleh & Ahmed, 2005). These findings 
contribute to the so called “big bath” hypothesis where firms may take advantage of the 
economic and political changes in crises and save up earnings for future periods.  
On the other hand, it is argued that managers may engage in income-increasing 
earnings management activity to meet earnings targets, to avoid violating lending 
covenants, to reduce pressure from stakeholders, and to preserve their reputation when 
firms are suffering from poor earnings performance or serious financial distress in an 
economic recession (Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Habib et al., 2013; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011; 
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Saleh & Ahmed, 2005). In addition, the specific economic 
circumstances in a crisis can also affect firms’ choices between accrual-based earnings 
management techniques and real earnings management techniques. For example, the 
realized shortfall between pre-managed earnings and the earnings target at year end can 
exceed the amount by which earnings can be increased by pure accrual manipulation 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Namely, managers might have attempted to increase the use of 
real earnings management when they run out of accrual discretions (Ewert & 
Wagenhofer, 2005). Firms may also switch from accrual-based earnings management to 
real earnings management when there are changes in the regulatory environment in a 
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crisis period, such as the passage of more strict financial reporting regulations (Cohen et 
al., 2008). 
 Therefore, based on findings from a review of the prior literature, there is 
expected to be an association between firms’ real earnings management and crisis as 
firms’ earnings management incentive and behaviours change in specific crisis periods. 
However, the findings reported by prior studies are inconsistent and provide 
inconclusive evidence on the direction of firms’ real earnings management behaviours 
during crisis periods. In addition to inconsistent findings on the direction of firms’ 
earnings management behaviours during crisis as discussed above, there is a lack of 
evidence directly on firms’ real earnings management behaviours during crisis or 
financial distress. No prior studies have specifically tested if financial crises are 
associated with firms’ real earnings management behaviours. The understanding of 
firms’ real earnings management activities may be better developed through 
investigating different real earnings management techniques, including sales 
manipulation, management of discretionary expenses and manipulation of production.  
During a crisis or recession, there are likely to be reductions in sales due to lower 
consumer confidence and purchasing power. Using the U.S. as an example, consumer 
demand for manufactured products overall decreased by 3.2 percent and demand for 
automobiles and auto parts declined by 12.5 percent between 2007 and 2008 (Dooley, 
Yan, Mohan, and Gopalakrishnan, 2010). There are also potential reductions in 
investment as firms are less optimistic regarding future performance and become more 
conservative (Wei & Zhang, 2008; Arslan, Florackis,& Ozkan, 2006). This signifies that 
there is a lower demand for both consumer products and industrial products, such as 
building supplies, during crisis and recession. Facing the reduced demands for products 
and services and dropping sales, managers have incentives to boost sales in a crisis 
period to overcome financial difficulties, to continue business operations, and to meet 
CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
46 
 
performance requirements set by stakeholders, such as creditors (Jaggi & Lee, 2002; 
Habib et al., 2013). Providing sales discount and offering customers more lenient credit 
terms are argued to be popular strategies for managers to temporarily increase sales 
during the year (Roychowdhury, 2006). This manipulation of sales upwards in the 
short-term would result in lower abnormal CFO in the current period relative to sales 
because lower margins are received from unit sale and cash flow is received over a 
longer period of time. Lower margins due to discounts also result in higher abnormal 
production costs than what is normally given the sales level.  
There are two views on the way discretionary expenses may be managed in a crisis. 
On one hand, advertising is argued to have positive impacts on firm value as it is an 
effective process of announcing products and strategies and of promoting the brand 
images and value of the company (White & Miles, 1996). Similarly, prior literature 
reports significant value relevance of R&D expenditures as there is expected to be a 
positive association between R&D investment and firms’ future performance (Chauvin 
& Hirschey, 1993; Sougiannis, 1994). And such value relevance of advertising and 
R&D expenditures is argued to be even more significant around the global financial 
crisis (Kwon, 2013). This is consistent with the claims that firms are more aggressive in 
reporting good news and delayed recognition of bad news during financial crisis (less 
conservative and less timely in financial reporting) (Vichitsarawong et al., 2010). 
Therefore, managers have incentives to increase discretionary expenses, such as 
advertising and R&D, to increase the perceived future value of the firms and to gain 
greater power in negotiation with the creditors during a financial crisis. The 
manipulation to increase discretionary expenses results in abnormally higher 
discretionary expenses and abnormally lower CFO relative to sales.  
On the other hand, managers may reduce discretionary expenses, such as R&D, 
advertising, and SG&A expenses, to boost earnings in the current accounting period as 
CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
47 
 
investing in these expenses does not result in a direct increase in the current period’s 
earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). The financial difficulties and even near collapse of the 
banking sectors and the capital markets during crisis periods led to a shortage in 
liquidity (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004). Firms with sustainable real 
operations have a higher likelihood of obtaining financing from either the banks or the 
market (Kousenidis, Ladas, & Negakis, 2013). As a result, firms with sustainable real 
operations are more likely to reduce discretionary expenses in order to meet earnings 
targets and maintain external financing in crisis periods. This is also consistent with the 
findings that higher cash holdings increases firms’ capability to undertake profitable 
investment opportunities and firms that are financially constrained are expected to 
accumulate cash to safeguard against future investment needs in a crisis context 
(Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Arslan et al., 2006). If this is the case, 
discretionary expenses are expected to be abnormally low relative to sales in crisis 
periods.  
In terms of production level, it can be difficult for firms to increase earnings 
through over production during a crisis period because the company may face liquidity 
issues as well as the stronger incentives to accumulate cash to safeguard against future 
investment needs (Almeida et al., 2004; Arslan et al., 2006). However, there is evidence 
that the large variations in consumer demand in a crisis reduce inventory management 
performance and increase costs (Metters, 1997). Also, the abnormal production costs 
may naturally go up when the inventories are piled up because of decreases in demand 
in the market and poor sales performance
9
. However, these are the normal responses to 
the financial crisis and cannot reflect managers’ real earnings management incentives. 
Therefore, the direction of production costs as a measure for real earnings management 
                                                     
9
 The difficulty to isolate managers’ incentive to engage in opportunistic earnings management from 
managers’ normal operation decisions during crisis can be a concern here. This is why the tests of 
hypothesis 4, which focuses on performance consequences of REM, are conducted to make implications 
for clarifying the opportunistic or managerial behaviours.  
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technique in crisis periods is uncertain.   
Figure 3.1 Different techniques of real earnings management in crises 
 
Figure 3.1 summarises the impact of sales manipulation, management of 
discretionary expenses and overproduction on abnormal CFO, abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal production costs. Taking into consideration the components of 
real earnings management, it is expected that firms have incentive to either increase or 
decrease reported earnings through the manipulation of real activities, especially 
through sales manipulation and the control of discretionary expenses. However, the 
direction of the manipulation is uncertain. Based on the discussion above, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H3A: There is a significant association between crisis and firms’ real earnings 
management behaviour. 
There is expected to be an association between firms’ real earnings management 
and crisis as firms’ earnings management incentive and behaviours change in specific 
ABCFO↓ 
ABPROD↑ 
Boosting sales through 
discounts and more 
lenient credit terms 
Manipulation of 
discretionary expenses 
Overproduction 
ABCFO? 
ABDISEXP? 
ABCFO? 
ABPROD? 
 
REM? 
↑:Increases  ↓: Decrease ?: Unclear direction  
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crisis periods. Although the two views of firms’ earnings management incentives, the 
big bath view and the income-increasing view conflict, they support the proposition that 
firms’ earnings management incentives and behaviour change in specific crisis contexts. 
The discussion of different real earnings management techniques that may be used in 
crisis periods also yield important implications for why it is important to investigate the 
impacts of real earnings management on firms’ performance and future cash flow in 
crises. The finding of negative impacts of real earnings management on firms’ future 
performance in times of crises supports the opportunistic view while a finding of 
positive impact supports the efficiency view. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
H3B: There is a significant association between REM and firms’ future 
performance and this association is moderated by crisis. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
The hypotheses developed in this chapter are summarized in the table below: 
Table 3.1 Summary of hypotheses 
H1A Firms in code-law countries engage in more real earnings management 
activities than firms in common-law countries after controlling for the effects 
of accruals management. 
H1B Firms in countries with weaker investor protection and law enforcement 
engage in more real earnings management activities than firms in countries 
with stronger investor protection and law enforcement after controlling for the 
effects of accruals management. 
H1C Firms engage in more real earnings management activities in countries with 
more concentrated ownership than countries with less concentrated ownership 
after controlling for the effects of accruals management. 
H2 There is a significant association between REM and firms’ future 
performance and this association is moderated by institutional environment. 
H3A There is a significant association between crisis and firms’ real earnings 
management behaviour. 
H3B There is a significant association between REM and firms’ future 
performance and this association is moderated by crisis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the research design and methodology used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3 are discussed. The chapter begins with a discussion of the data 
and sample selection in section 4.2. This is followed by section 4.3, which includes a 
discussion of the way accrual-based and real earnings management are measured in this 
thesis. Section 4.4 discusses the research design for each hypothesis to show how the 
hypotheses are tested and how the variables are defined. Section 4.5 discusses 
limitations of the research designs. Chapter 4.6 provides a summary of the research 
methods of this thesis.  
4.2 Data collection 
To test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, firms’ accounting data is collected 
from Wharton Compustat Global database for the period between 1996 and 2012. The 
starting sample year of 1996 is chosen because an increasing amount of data points are 
missing for years before 1995 from the Wharton Compustat Global database for many 
countries. Data on GDP growth for different countries and years is collected from the 
database of World Bank and the World Economic Outlook database provided by the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). The data cleaning process can be seen from Table 
4.1 below. Following previous studies, such as Leuz et al. (2003) and Roychowdhury 
(2006), regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 5000) and banks and 
financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500) are deleted from the sample. 
There are data losses due to missing data and the calculation of lagged variables as well 
as future performance variables. The models for normal CFO, normal production costs, 
normal discretionary expenses, and accruals are estimated by every year and industry 
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for every country based on the one-digit SIC code. And I require at least 10 
observations for each industry-year grouping for all the countries. I also require the 
countries that are included in the final sample to have at least 150 firm-year 
observations. Countries are identified using the country of incorporation variable from 
the Wharton Compustat Global database. As a result, the final sample comes to 135,722 
firm-year observations and 20,968 unique firms for 31 countries from 1996 to 2011
10
.  
Table 4.1 Data cleaning process 
Initial data collected for 37 countries  287,430 
Less: firms in regulated industries (between SIC 4400 and 5000) 
and banks and financial institutions (between SIC6000 and 6500) 
50,975 
Less: missing data and data loss due to calculation of lagged 
variables and future ROA/ future CFO 
100,110 
Less: countries with less than 150 data points 623 
Final sample (firm-year observations) 135,722 
 
4.3 Earnings management measures and control variables 
4.3.1 Measuring accrual earnings management 
To proxy for accrual-based earnings management, this thesis adopts the modified 
Jones (1991) model to compute discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the 
difference between the actual accruals and the normal level of accruals. Modified Jones 
model is estimated for each year and industry, which means that industry-wide changes 
in economic conditions that affect total accruals are controlled for. The modified Jones 
model is employed to compute total accruals (TA) for every industry and year for each 
                                                     
10
 More statistics and characteristics of the sample are discussed in the descriptive statistics section in 
Chapter 5. 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD 
51 
 
country based on one-digit SIC code
11
 as follows: 
   
    
= α1
 
    
 +α2
   
    
 +α3
    
    
 + εt                      (4.1) 
Where TAt is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
minus the operating cash flows reported in the statement of cash flow in year t. At-1 is 
total assets at the end of period t-1 (i.e. lagged assets). St is the operating revenue during 
period t. ΔSt is the changes in sales/turnover in year t. ΔSt = St – St-1. PPEt is the gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t. The above regression is estimated for every 
industry and year for each country with at least 10 observations in the particular 
industry and year.  
The coefficient estimates from equation (4.1) are then used to estimate the 
firm-specific normal accruals (NAt): 
   = α1
 
    
 +α2
        
    
 +α3
    
    
 + εt              (4.2) 
Where ΔARt is the change in accounts receivable in year t from the preceding year. 
Then, discretionary accrual (DAt) that is used to proxy for accrual-based earnings 
management in this thesis is measured as: 
    = 
   
    
 ―                  (4.3) 
4.3.2 Measuring real earnings management 
Prior literature develops models to capture real earnings management through 
measuring the abnormal levels of operating cash flow (CFO), discretionary expenses, 
and production costs. In this thesis, the estimation models for normal CFO, 
discretionary expenses, and production costs for every year and industry and for every 
country are based on Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006). First, normal 
                                                     
11
One digit SIC code is used to ensure small countries have sufficient data points to be selected and 
maximize the number of countries that can be contained in the final sample based on selection 
requirements.  
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CFO is expressed as a linear function of sales and change in sales in the current period. 
The cross-sectional regression estimating normal or expected level of CFO for every 
industry and year and for each country is shown below: 
    
    
= α1
 
    
 +α2 
  
    
 + α3 
   
    
 +εt                 (4.4)                   
CFOt is cash flow from operations at the end of year t.  
Using the estimated coefficients from equation (4.4) the expected or normal CFO 
in year t can be computed using the corresponding firm-year’s St and At-1. Abnormal 
CFO (ABCFO) for every firm-year is computed as actual CFO minus the normal CFO. 
I also follow Roychowdhury’s (2006) estimation of normal discretionary expense: 
       
    
 =α1
 
    
 + α2 
  
    
 +εt            (4.5) 
Similarly, the normal level discretionary expense is estimated as a function of sales 
and total assets. This regression is again estimated for each industry and year and for 
every country based on one-digit SIC. Actual discretionary expense is equal to the sum 
of R&D expenses and SG&A expenses. As long as SG&A costs are available, R&D 
expenses are set to zero if they are missing. The abnormal discretionary expense 
(ABDISEXP) is computed using actual discretionary expense minus normal 
discretionary expense.  
Third, production costs are defined as the sum of COGS (Costs of Goods Sold) and 
change in inventory during the period. Following Dechow et al. (1998), Roychowdhury 
(2006), and Gunny (2010), the normal level of production costs in period t is estimated 
for each year and industry for every country using the following regression:  
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 +εt            (4.6) 
The abnormal production cost (ABPROD) is computed using the actual production 
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costs (the sum of actual COGS and actual changes in inventory during the period) 
minus the normal level of production costs.  
In addition to individual real earnings management measures, which include 
ABCOF, ABPROD, and ABDISEXP, one aggregate real earnings management measure 
is developed based on Cohen et al. (2008). REM is the sum of the mean abnormal CFO 
(ABCFO), mean abnormal production cost (ABPROD) and mean abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP), where ABCFO and ABDISEXP are multiplied by 
(-1) to present higher real earnings management when the REM measure increases.  
However, Roychowdhury (2006) claims that real activities manipulation affects 
abnormal cash flows in an ambiguous direction. While reducing discretionary expenses 
increase cash flows price discount, channel stuffing and overproduction decreases cash 
flows (Zang, 2012). Therefore, based on Zang (2012), REM2 is developed to capture 
the real earnings management behaviours that include overproduction and reducing of 
discretionary expenses to boost earnings. This measure is the sum of ABPROD and 
ABDISEXP multiplied by -1. Since this measure is largely similar to REM, the results 
using REM2 will only be discussed in the additional tests in Chapter 5.  
4.3.3 Control variables 
A number of control variables are included in the regression models in this thesis. 
Firm size and growth of the firm need to be controlled for to address systematic 
variations in real earnings management activities due to different firm size and 
differences in growth opportunities (Roychowdhury, 2006). SIZE is the natural log of 
total assets and GROWTH is measured as the percentage increase in sales. According to 
Dechow et al. (1995), measurements of abnormal accruals have measurement error 
positively correlated with firm performance. ROA is included in the regression models 
to control for the measurement error related with firm performance. ROA is calculated 
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as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. SIZE, GROWTH 
and ROA are used in many earnings management studies, such as Leuz et al. (2003), 
Gunny (2010) and Zang (2012). Leverage is also found to be associated with firms’ 
earnings management choices. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) report that earnings 
manipulation firms have higher leverage ratios and are more likely to violate debt 
covenants. Therefore, LEV, another control variable, is calculated as total liabilities 
divided by total assets.  
In addition, prior literature provides findings in relation to the changes of firms’ 
real earnings management behaviour overtime. Cohen et al. (2008), for example, report 
a negative and significant coefficient for the Time variable when RM_PROXY is the 
dependent variable over the period between 1987 and 2005. In their study, RM_PROXY 
is a real earnings management measure that sums abnormal CFO, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production and Time is a trend variable equal to 
the difference between the current year and 1987. The decrease of real earnings 
management behaviour over time can be related to the enhanced institutional 
environment in the world, such as stronger shareholder protection legislation and more 
developed financial markets, especially the catching up of code-law countries (Armour 
et al., 2009). The trend of globalisation, the convergence of accounting policy, and firms’ 
cross listing activities in foreign countries may also contribute to enhanced earnings 
quality over time (Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Lang, Raedy, & Yetman, 2003; 
Land & Lang, 2002). Therefore, a TIME variable is developed, which is a trend variable 
equal to the difference between the current year and 1995. Also, the change in GDP is 
added as an additional explanatory variable to control for the effects of a country’s 
economic development (Leuz et al., 2003; Shen & Chih, 2005). ΔGDP represents the 
annual growth rate of GDP for all countries collected from World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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4.4. Research design for testing the hypotheses 
4.4.1 Estimation models and regression formulas for Hypothesis 1 
Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C test the association between measures of real earnings 
management and different country-level institutional factors. The estimation models for 
Hypothesis 1A, 1B and 1Care listed below as: 
REMt = α + β1INSTITUTION + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + 
β6LEVt + β7TIME t + β8ΔGDPt + εt            (4.7) 
Where REM is the sum of the abnormal CFO (ABCFO), abnormal production cost 
(ABPROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP), where ABCFO and 
ABDISEXP are multiplied by (-1) to present higher real earnings management when the 
REM measure increases. Therefore, REM represents residuals from the CFO, 
production cost, and discretionary expenses models. INSTITUTION refers to 
institutional environment measures, including TRADITION, FRENCH, PROTECTION, 
ENFORCEMENT, and OWNERSHIP. Equation 4.7 is regressed using individual 
institutional variables separately.  
The classification of legal tradition is based on La Porta et al. (1998). TRADITION 
is a dummy variable that equals 0 for countries that belong to the code-law tradition and 
1 for countries that belong to the common-law tradition. Therefore, β1 is expected to be 
negative and significant if Hypothesis 1A is supported.  
FRENCH is a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries that belong to the 
French-civil-law tradition and 0 otherwise. Therefore, β1 is expected to be positive and 
significant to support Hypothesis 1A.  
The PROTECTION variable is the “anti-director rights” index developed by La 
Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges 
from 0 to 5. If Hypothesis 1B is correct, β1 is expected to be negative and significant.  
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ENFORCEMENT represents legal enforcement, which is measured as the mean 
score across three legal variables from La Porta et al. (1998), including the efficiency of 
the judicial system, the rule of law, and the corruption index. All of these three variables 
range from 0 to 10. If Hypothesis 1B is correct, β1 is expected to be negative and 
significant.  
OWNERSHIP is the measure of ownership concentration, which is measured as 
the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the 
ten largest privately owned non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 1998). To support 
Hypothesis 1C, β1 is expected to be positive and significant.  
4.4.2 Estimation models and regression formulas for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 investigates the impacts of real earnings management on firms’ future 
performance and how such impacts are related to institutional environment. In order to 
test Hypothesis 2, two measures are developed based on Gunny (2010). AdjROA 
measures the difference between firm-specific ROA and the mean ROA for the same 
year and industry in the firm’s home country. ROA is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. AdjCFO measures the difference 
between firm-specific CFO and the mean CFO for the same year and industry for that 
country. CFO is cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets. The following 
equations (4.8 and 4.9) are developed to test Hypothesis 2: 
AdjROAt+1= α + β1REMQt + β2INSTITUTION + β3REMQ*INSTITUTION + 
β4SIZEt + β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt + β7LEVt+ β8TIMEt + β9ΔGDPt + εt     (4.8) 
AdjCFOt+1= α + β1REMQt + β2INSTITUTION + β3REMQ*INSTITUTION + 
β4SIZEt + β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt + β7LEVt+ β8TIMEt + β9ΔGDPt + εt     (4.9) 
Based on Gunny (2010), a new variable REMQ is developed. REMQ is an 
indicator variable that equal to one if the sum of the residuals from the CFO model, the 
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production cost model, and the discretionary model, where CFO and discretionary 
expenses models are mutiplied by (-1), is in the highest quintile, zero otherwise. This 
indicator variable is constructed for each country.  
INSTITUTION includes TRADITION, PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT, and 
OWNERSHIP. Again, equations are regressed for each institutional variable separately.  
If Hypothesis 2 is supported β1 and β3 are expected to be significant in both 
equations. 
4.4.3 Estimation models and regression formulas for Hypothesis 3 
In order to test Hypothesis 3A, which examines firms’ real earnings management 
behaviours during a financial crisis, a CRISIS dummy is developed added into the 
regression, which equals to 1 for crisis period and 0 otherwise. Crisis period is 
identified by the negative annual GDP growth for a particular year using GDP data from 
World Bank and IMF.  
Hypothesis 3A is tested using the equation below: 
REMt = α+ β1CRISIS + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt 
+β7TIMEt + β8ΔGDPt + εt                       (4.10) 
In equation 4.10, the dummy variable CRISIS measures the proportionate 
difference in real earnings management of firms in the crisis period relative to non-crisis 
period holding the control variables constant. Hypothesis 3A is also tested using 
subcategories of real earnings management, including ABCFO, ABDISEXP, and 
ABPROD as the dependent variables. The equations for testing subcategories of real 
earnings management include: 
ABCFOt = α+ β1CRISIS + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt 
+β7TIMEt + β8ΔGDPt + εt                       (4.11) 
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ABDISEXPt = α+ β1CRISIS + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt 
+β6LEVt +β7TIMEt + β8ΔGDPt + εt                  (4.12) 
ABPRODt = α+ β1CRISIS + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt 
+β7TIMEt + β8ΔGDPt + εt                       (4.13) 
To support Hypothesis 3A, β1 is expected to be significant for equations 4.10, 4.11, 
4.12 and 4.13.  
To test H3B, equation 4.14 is developed: 
AdjROAt+1 or AdjCFOt+1 = α + β1REMt + β2CRISIS + β3CRISIS*REM+ β4SIZEt 
+β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt + β7 LEVt + β8TIMEt + β9ΔGDPt + εt     (4.14) 
If H3B is supported, β1 and β3 are expected to be statistically significant.  
A detailed variable definition for all variables used in equations described above 
testing the hypotheses is presented in GLOSSARY. 
4.5 Limitations 
Firstly, the research design cannot differentiate firms’ real earnings management 
behaviour and the normal managerial decision making. Managers’ real earnings 
management activities may be their rational responses to economic circumstances 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). This is often an issue in earnings management studies regarding 
how well the earnings management measures capture firms’ earnings management 
behaviours. This is the reason it is important to study the consequences of real earnings 
management. If the finding documents negative impacts of real earnings management 
on firms’ future performance, there is evidence supporting the opportunistic earnings 
management perspective. If the results show positive impacts of real earnings 
management on firms’ future performance, managers’ normal course of actions in 
organisational management and control may have played a stronger role. The design of 
incorporating an industry average and a normal level of activities, such as normal CFO 
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and normal discretionary expenses, can also contribute to the control of this limitation.  
Secondly, the sample selected to test the models described above may face 
limitations, such as fewer data points in the earlier years, uneven distribution of 
industries, and significant differences in number of observations for large and small 
countries. And many countries have to be excluded from the study as there are not 
sufficient data points for the country or that the country does not have the institutional 
variables developed by studies such as La Porta et al. (1998). More issues and solutions 
with data selection will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 and additional tests will 
be performed in response to some of these limitations.   
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4.6 Chapter summary  
The methods and regression formulas developed to test the hypotheses are summarised in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Summary of regression models testing the hypotheses 
Hypotheses Key variable Equation Estimated sign 
H1A TRADITION REMt = α + β1TRADITION + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + 
β7TIME t + β8ΔGDPt + εt 
― 
FRENCH REMt = α + β1FRENCH + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + 
β7TIME t + β8ΔGDPt + εt 
+ 
H1B 
 
PROTECTION REMt = α + β1PROTECTION + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + 
β7TIME t + β8ΔGDPt + εt 
― 
ENFORCEMENT REMt = α + β1ENFORCEMENT + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt 
+ β7TIME t + β8ΔGDPt + εt 
― 
H1C OWNERSHIP REMt = α + β1OWNERSHIP + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + 
β7TIME t + β8ΔGDPt + εt 
+ 
H2 REM 
REM*INSTITUTION  
AdjROAt+1 or AdjCFOt+1 = α + β1REMt + β2INSTITUTION + β3REM*INSTITUTION 
+ β4SIZEt + β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt + β7LEVt + β8TIMEt + β9ΔGDP + εt 
 
H3A CRISIS REMt = α+ β1CRISIS + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt +β7TIMEt 
+ β8ΔGDPt + εt 
 
H3B REM 
CRISIS *REM  
AdjROAt+1 or AdjCFOt+1 = α + β1REMt + β2CRISIS + β3CRISIS*REM+ β4SIZEt 
+β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt + β7 LEVt + β8TIMEt + β9ΔGDPt + εt 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are tested using methods reported in 
Chapter 4. The results of the tests of the hypotheses are reported in this Chapter. I will 
discuss the general characteristics of the sample and some results of univariate analysis 
in section 5.2. Then the multivariate analysis results for testing hypotheses 1 to 3 are 
discussed in sections 5.3.In addition, I will discuss the results of robustness tests and 
additional tests in section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides a summary of the findings reported 
in this chapter.    
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
5.2.1 General characteristics of the sample 
As discussed in section 4.2, the final sample consists of 135,722 firm-year 
observations from 31 countries between 1996 and 2011. The sample includes 20,968 
unique firms. As can be seen from Table 5.1, data of the U.S. has a 25.95% share of the 
whole sample with 35,217 firms-year observations. Japan has the second largest share 
(15.75%) of the sample followed by China (9.31%). United Kingdom, India, and 
Taiwan also have significant share of the sample with a 7.89%, 7.32% and 5.49% share 
respectively. And from a legal origin perspective, common-law countries share 56.76% 
of the sample while code-law countries share 43.24% of the entire sample.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of country specific and economic statistics for each country  
Country N # of unique firms % of sample % of Mfg firms GDP Crisis period 
Australia 4,120 887 3.04% 0.346 3.46% ― 
Brazil 1,597 13 1.18% 0.613 3.28% 2009 
Canada 4,014 793 2.96% 0.310 2.76% 2009 
Chile 189 21 0.14% 1.000 4.55% 1999,2009 
China 12,640 2027 9.31% 0.697 10.07% ― 
Denmark 155 45 0.11% 0.821 1.69% 2008,2009 
Finland 359 49 0.26% 0.563 2.91% 2009 
France 2,486 442 1.83% 0.542 1.73% 2008,2009 
Germany 3,129 564 2.31% 0.614 1.48% 2003,2009 
Greece 151 58 0.11% 0.448 1.96% 2008,2009,2010,2011 
Hong Kong 461 149 0.34% 0.669 3.79% 1998,2009 
India 9,929 1729 7.32% 0.790 7.04% ― 
Indonesia 797 94 0.59% 0.960 4.43% 1998 
Israel 169 46 0.12% 0.687 4.21% 2001,2002 
Italy 535 128 0.39% 0.597 1.05% 2003,2008,2009 
Japan 21,372 3130 15.75 0.548 0.80% 1998,1999,2008,2009,2011 
Korea 3,703 613 2.73% 0.793 4.77% 1998 
Malaysia 4,331 816 3.19% 0.643 5.31% 1998,2009 
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Mexico 164 17 0.12% 1.000 2.59% 2001,2009 
Norway 202 98 0.15% 0.332 2.43% 2009 
Pakistan 222 72 0.16% 1.000 3.89% ― 
Peru 159 28 0.12% 0.372 5.45% 1998 
Philippines 155 48 0.11% 0.510 4.36% 1998 
Singapore 2,987 592 2.20% 0.533 6.10% 1998,2001,2009 
South Africa 1,437 251 1.06% 0.352 3.29% 2009 
Sweden 2,533 428 1.87% 0.531 2.81% 2008,2009 
Switzerland 1,076 140 0.79% 0.843 1.73% 2009 
Taiwan 7,449 1282 5.49% 0.857 4.64% 2001,2009 
Thailand 3,281 428 2.42% 0.620 3.62% 1997,1998,2009 
United Kingdom 10,703 1792 7.89% 0.406 2.50% 2008,2009 
U.S. 35,217 4188 25.95% 0.536 2.60% 2008,2009 
Total number of observations 135,722     
The data shown in this table is collected from Wharton Compustat Global database for the period between 1996 and 2012 for 31 countries. Crisis period is identified by the 
negative annual GDP growth for a particular year using GDP data from World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Manufacturing firms are identified as firms with 
SIC of 2000 to 3999 inclusively.  
 
  
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
64 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of institutional variables for each country 
Country Country Code Legal origin TRADITION PROTECTION ENFORCEMENT OWNERSHIP Median REM 
Australia AUS English CM 4.000 9.500 0.280 -0.202 
Brazil BRA French CD 3.000 6.130 0.630 -0.259 
Canada CAN English CM 5.000 9.800 0.240 -0.074 
Chile CHL French CD 5.000 6.520 0.380 -0.192 
China CHN German CD 3.000 3.500 0.290 -0.211 
Denmark DNK Scandinavian CD 2.000 10.000 0.400 -0.166 
Finland FIN Scandinavian CD 3.000 10.000 0.340 -0.134 
France FRA French CD 3.000 8.700 0.240 -0.246 
Germany DEU German CD 1.000 9.100 0.500 -0.308 
Greece GRC French CD 2.000 6.800 0.680 -0.117 
Hong Kong HKG English CM 5.000 8.900 0.540 -0.213 
India IND English CM 5.000 5.600 0.430 -0.281 
Indonesia IDN French CD 2.000 2.900 0.620 -0.172 
Israel ISR English CM 3.000 7.720 0.550 -0.335 
Italy ITA French CD 1.000 7.100 0.600 -0.146 
Japan JPN German CD 4.000 9.200 0.130 0.490 
Korea KOR German CD 2.000 5.600 0.200 -0.247 
Malaysia MYS English CM 4.000 7.700 0.520 -0.184 
Mexico MEX French CD 1.000 5.370 0.670 -0.160 
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Norway NOR Scandinavian CD 4.000 10.000 0.310 -0.160 
Pakistan PAK English CM 5.000 3.700 0.410 -0.133 
Peru PER English CM 3.000 4.650 0.570 -0.032 
Philippines PHL French CD 3.000 3.500 0.510 -0.126 
Singapore SGP English CM 4.000 8.900 0.530 -0.240 
South Africa ZAF English CM 5.000 6.400 0.520 -0.505 
Sweden SWE Scandinavian CD 3.000 10.000 0.280 -0.270 
Switzerland CHE German CD 2.000 10.000 0.480 -0.278 
Taiwan TWN German CD 3.000 7.400 0.140 -0.316 
Thailand THA English CM 2.000 4.900 0.480 -0.268 
United Kingdom GBR English CM 5.000 9.200 0.150 -0.342 
U.S. USA English CM 5.000 9.500 0.120 -0.445 
Total number of observations 135,722 
The country code for each country is collected from Wharton Compustat Global database based on the country of incorporation variable. The institutional variables for all countries 
except China shown in this table are developed based on La Porta et al. (1998). TRADITION is a dummy variable that equals 0 for countries that belong to the code-law tradition 
and 1 for countries that belong to the common-law tradition. The PROTECTION variable is the “anti-director rights” index developed by La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate 
measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from 0 to 5.ENFORCEMENT represents legal enforcement, which is measured as the mean score across three legal variables 
from La Porta et al. (1998), including the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, and the corruption index. All of these three variables range from 0 to 10.OWNERSHIP is 
the measure of ownership concentration, which is measured as the medium percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned 
non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 1998).The institutional variables for China are taken from Allen, Qian and Qian (2005).  
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In addition, as Table 5.1 illustrates, among the 31 countries, the observations of 
Chile, Mexico and Pakistan are 100 percent from manufacturing industries, which 
include firms with SIC from 2000 to 3999 inclusively. A number of countries, such as 
Denmark, Indonesia, Switzerland, and Taiwan also had a considerably high proportion 
of manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms contribute to 63.010% of the whole 
sample
12
.  
Table 5.1 also presents data in relation to the average GDP growth for each country 
during the sample period and the period during which the countries experienced crisis. 
From 1996 to 2011, China had an average GDP growth of 10.07%, which is 
substantially higher than the average GDP growth of other countries in the sample. India 
has the second highest average GDP growth rate of 7.04% and Singapore’s average 
GDP growth of 6.10% is the third highest amongst 31 countries. Japan had the lowest 
average GDP growth rate of 0.80% in the sample period. On average, common-law 
countries had a GDP growth rate of 4.16% in the sample period, which is higher than 
the GDP growth rate of 3.18% for code-law countries. In terms of the crisis period, 
which is identified if the country had a negative GDP growth for a particular year 
comparing to the previous year, Australia, China, India, and Pakistan did not have a year 
with negative GDP growth in the sample period. Japan, on the other hand, had the most 
number of years that are identified as a crisis period, including 1998, 1999, 2008, 2009 
and 2011. 
Table 5.2 displays institutional variables, including legal origin, TRADITION, 
PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT, and OWNERSHIP, which are based on prior studies, 
such as La Porta et al. (1998). The definition of such variables can be found from 
Glossary. Institutional variables for China are not provided by the prior studies, such as 
                                                     
12
 To alleviate the concern that the differences in industry composition may drive the regression analysis 
results in this thesis, an additional test is conducted with a sample that comprises only manufacturing 
firms (SIC 2000-3999 inclusively). The results for such test are discussed in section 5.4. 
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La Porta et al. (1998). The institutional variables for China are taken from Allen, Qian 
and Qian (2005). Allen et al. (2005) develop the anti-director right variable based on La 
Porta et al. (1998). The law enforcement variable for China is taken as the mean score 
across two legal variables, including the rule of law and the corruption index, provided 
in Allen et al. (2005) based on the method of La Porta et al. (1998). The measure of law 
enforcement for China is slightly different to that for other countries because the 
efficiency of judicial system measure is not available for China. Ownership 
concentration index for China is taken from the concentration score for domestic China 
as reported by Allen et al. (2005). The institutional variables of China, therefore, are 
developed consistently with the measurements of institutional environment of other 
countries as reported in La Porta et al. (1998) according to Allen et al. (2005). The 
measurements of institutional variables, therefore, should not influence the results of 
this thesis. And the institutional variables developed by Allen et al. (2005) allow this 
research to include China, which is a large economy with an increasing importance, into 
the final sample for testing
13
. Table 5.2 also displays median REM for each country. 
Japan has the highest median REM of 0.490 while South Africa has the lowest median 
REM of -0.505. In fact, Japan is the only country with a positive median REM. The 
majority of the countries have a median REM of approximately between -0.150 and 
-0.270. 
Table 5.3 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, first quartile and third 
quartile of key variables. In general, there is a negative mean REM of -0.229 and a 
positive mean DA of 0.017 for the whole sample. The mean size of firm for the whole 
sample is 6.761. The mean values of the performance variables, including ROA, 
AdjROA, and AdjCFO, are all positive for the whole sample period. It is interesting to 
                                                     
13
. In order alleviate the concern that the differences in the measurements for institutional environment in 
China used in the research process may affect the results, an additional test is conducted without the data 
points from China. The results are presented and discussed in section 5.4  
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note that SIZE has a high standard deviation of 2.806. The large variation in firm sizes 
in different countries is also noted in other international studies, such as Leuz et al. 
(2003). In terms of individual countries, South Africa has the lowest average REM of 
-0.553 and Japan has the highest average REM of 0.522 among all countries over the 
sample period. Norway has the lowest mean DA of -0.086 and Brazil has the highest 
mean DA of 0.140 over the whole sample period. Taiwan has the largest SIZE of 8.338 
while Pakistan has the lowest SIZE of 1.315. There is a large variation in firm sizes in 
countries, such as Australia, Canada, Chile, Philippines, Sweden, United Kingdom, and 
U.S. even after the data is winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent levels. In terms of the 
performance of firms, Canada has the lowest ROA of -0.147 and Peru has the highest 
ROA of 0.125. Denmark has the highest mean GROWTH of 0.346, and Brazil has the 
highest mean LEV of 0.823. 
In addition, based on data on individual years, REM and DA often change in the 
opposite direction, such as in years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2010 and 2011. The 
trend of DA is more stable than the changes in REM in early years. The changes in DA 
are more significant in recent years, after 2005. There is a general trend of increasing 
REM from 1996 to 2012 for the whole sample.   
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Table 5.3: Summary of key variables for the whole sample over the period of 1996 to 2011 
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation First Quartile (25%) Third Quartile (75%) 
REMt -0.229 -0.206 0.594 -0.517 0.049 
DAt 0.017 -0.017 0.374 -0.088 0.049 
ABCFOt 0.002 0.035 0.253 -0.054 0.106 
ABDISEXPt 0.246 0.145 0.367 0.056 0.315 
ABPRODt 0.015 -0.067 0.469 -0.221 0.113 
SIZEt 6.761 6.791 2.806 4.818 8.676 
ROAt 0.002 0.030 0.279 -0.011 0.076 
GROWTHt 0.107 0.061 0.322 -0.047 0.212 
LEVt 0.515 0.507 0.261 0.333 0.664 
ΔGDPt 0.035 0.029 0.039 -0.028 0.051 
AdjROAt+1 0.007 0.016 0.178 -0.029 0.084 
AdjCFOt+1 0.015 0.018 0.161 -0.043 0.092 
Total number of observations 135,722   
Definitions of the key variables can be found from Glossary 
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Table 5.4: Correlation matrix for key variables 
 REM DA TRADITION PROTECTION ENFORCEMENT OWERSHIP SIZE ROA GROWTH LEV 
DA -0.044*** 1         
TRADITION -0.382*** 0.058*** 1        
PROTECTION -0.130*** 0.064*** 0.716*** 1       
ENFORCEMENT 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.296*** 0.451*** 1      
OWENRSHIP -0.059*** -0.054*** 0.021*** -0.416*** -0.499*** 1     
SIZE 0.411*** -0.033*** -0.492*** -0.185*** -0.144*** -0.095*** 1    
ROA -0.020*** 0.060*** -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.131*** 0.092*** 0.212*** 1   
GROWTH -0.112*** -0.002 0.072*** 0.031*** -0.090*** 0.069*** -0.024*** 0.066*** 1  
LEV 0.068*** -0.020*** -0.032*** 0.001 -0.006** 0.015*** 0.046*** -0.160*** -0.034*** 1 
ΔGDP -0.100*** -0.011*** -0.078*** -0.173*** -0.662*** 0.349*** 0.014*** 0.094*** 0.167*** -0.029*** 
Total number of observations is 135,722. Definitions of the variables can be found from Glossary 
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Correlations between key variables are shown in Table 5.4. There is a positive 
correlation of 0.411 between REM and SIZE. Firms with large size, which is measured 
as the natural log of total assets, are probably involved in more production rather than 
services provisions, which provide conditions for real earnings manipulations. The high 
correlation between REM and SIZE may also be related to the high proportion of 
manufacturing firms in the sample. The significant and negative correlation between 
SIZE and TRADITION indicates that firms from countries with a code-law tradition 
have a larger size on average. In addition, some institutional variables, such as 
PROTECTION, ONWERSHIP and ENFORCEMENT have high correlation with one 
another. This is the reason, as according to prior international studies, such as Leuz et al. 
(2003), that institutional variables are regressed one at a time in the regression tests.   
5.2.2 Univariate analysis 
Univariate analysis is performed for key variables for the whole sample. Table 5.5 
presents t-test results for key variables comparing countries from the common-law and 
code-law traditions. As compared to code-law countries, common-law countries are 
found to have lower REM, higher DA, higher ABCFO, lower ABDISEXP, and lower 
ABPROD. All results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The lower REM 
for firms from common-law countries than those from code-law countries provides 
some support for Hypothesis 1A. Compared to code-law countries, common-law 
countries have significantly higher ROA, higher growth, and lower leverage. Consistent 
with the high correlation between SIZE and TRADITION, there is a significant 
difference of -2.785 in terms of firm size between common-law and code-law countries, 
showing that firms are larger in code-law countries.  
Also as Table 5.5 illustrates, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test results show that firms 
from common-law countries exhibit higher real earnings management than firms from 
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code-law countries based on a negative and significant (-0.226) difference between 
common-law country REM median and code-law country REM median. Firms in 
common-law countries also show a higher abnormal CFO, a lower abnormal 
discretionary expense, and a lower abnormal production costs to manage earnings. And 
comparing the mean and median for key variables for the common-law tradition, there 
is a high skewness for DA, ABCOF, and ROA. And for code-law countries, there is a 
high skewness for REM, indicating that there are firms that engage in a high level of 
real earnings management, which drags up the average REM measures for firms from 
code-law countries.  
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Table 5.5: T-test (mean difference) and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (median difference) results for key variables comparing common-law and 
code-law traditions 
 
Variables CM CD Difference (CM－CD) Difference (CM-CD) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
REM -0.427 -0.317 0.031 -0.091 -0.459*** 
(-152.49) 
-0.226*** 
(-126.22) 
DA 0.035 -0.025 -0.008 -0.012 0.044*** 
(21.47) 
-0.013*** 
(-18.88) 
ABCFO 0.026 -0.016 -0.040 -0.047 0.066*** 
(48.10) 
0.031*** 
(44.15) 
ABDISEXP -0.308 -0.181 -0.164 -0.122 -0.144*** 
(-72.84) 
-0.059*** 
(-49.55) 
ABPROD -0.152 -0.111 0.234 0.004 -0.386*** 
(-164.82) 
-0.115*** 
(-121.31) 
SIZE 5.557 6.652 8.342 8.425 -2.785*** 
(-208.05) 
-1.773*** 
(-179.51) 
ROA -0.018 0.036 0.029 0.026 -0.047*** 
(-31.02) 
0.010*** 
(10.73) 
GROWTH 0.127 0.072 0.080 0.050 0.047*** 
(26.45) 
0.022*** 
(18.24) 
LEV 0.508 0.491 0.525 0.525 -0.017*** 
(11.80) 
-0.034*** 
(-23.51) 
Total number of observations 135,722   
Definitions of the variables can be found from Glossary. CM stands for common-law traditions and CD stands for code-law traditions.  
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
74 
 
5. 3 Multivariate analysis 
5.3.1 Results for Hypothesis 1 
Table 5.6 reports the results of the regression analysis for Hypothesis 1, which tests 
the relationship between country-level institutional factors and firms’ real earnings 
management activities.  
The regression results are tested using formula 4.7. The negative and significant 
coefficient for TRADITION of -0.292 indicates that firms domiciled in code-law 
countries engage in more real earnings management activities than those domiciled in 
common-law countries. Since TRADITION is a dummy variable that is 1 for 
common-law countries and 0 for code-law countries, the result shows that real earnings 
management in code-law countries is 0.292 higher than real earnings management in 
common-law countries, holding other variables constant. The results provide support for 
Hypothesis 1A. The coefficient for FRENCH is reported to be significantly positive at 
the 1 percent significance level (0.069), indicating that firms engage in more real 
earnings management activities in French-civil-law countries than countries with other 
legal traditions. This result provides additional support for Hypothesis 1A. The results 
support that difference in legal traditions is associated with firms’ choices in engaging in 
real earnings management activities.  
Table 5.6 also reports regression results testing Hypothesis 1B, which investigates 
the relationship between real earnings management and outside investor protection. 
There is a negative and significant coefficient result for PROTECTION (-0.042), 
showing that there is more earnings management activities in countries with lower 
investor protection. The significantly negative coefficient for ENFORCEMENT (-0.008) 
indicates that firms engage in more real earnings management in countries with weaker 
law enforcement. The results support Hypothesis 1B that firms engage in more real 
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earnings management activities in countries with weaker investor protection and law 
enforcement.  
Consistent with the prediction and supporting Hypothesis 1C, the coefficient for 
OWNERSHIP is 0.122 and is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This result 
shows that firms engage in more real earnings management in countries with more 
concentrated ownership. 
The adjusted R
2
 for the regression tests are about 0.2. This is slightly lower than 
the R
2
 of about 0.3 in Leuz et al. (2003), which provides international comparisons of 
accrual-based earnings management. But the adjusted R
2
reported in the results for this 
hypothesis is significantly higher than R
2
 of around 0.01 in Cohen et al. (2008), which 
tested both real and accrual-based earnings management.  
In summary, the results for testing Hypothesis 1 are consistent with the hypotheses 
and provide additional evidence on the association between institutional environment 
and firms’ accounting integrity and earnings management choices as reported in La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz et al. (2003). My results support a significant impact of 
legal tradition, shareholder protection, enforcement, and ownership on firms’ real 
earnings management behaviours. In particular, the findings of Hypothesis 1A, 1B, and 
1C show that there is higher real earnings management in countries with a code-law 
tradition, a French-civil-law tradition, lower investor protection, lower law enforcement, 
and countries with more concentrated ownership.  
In regard to control variables, the coefficients of DA are negative in all of the 
regressions reported in Table 5.6, indicating that as real earnings management activities 
increase discretionary accruals decrease. This result is consistent with the prior literature 
that argues for a substituting effect between DA and REM (Zang, 2012). The results 
also show that there is higher real earnings management for larger firms, firms with 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
76 
 
lower ROA, firms with lower growth, and firms with higher leverage. The negative and 
significant coefficients for TIME indicate that real earnings management activities have 
decreased over the time period from 1996 to 2011. This is consistent with the regression 
results of Cohen et al. (2008), which report a negative and significant coefficient for the 
Time variable wherein RM_PROXY is the dependent variable over the period between 
1987 and 2005. The significantly negative coefficients for ΔGDP indicate that there is 
higher real earning management in poorer economic conditions. 
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Table 5.6: Real earnings management and institutional environment 
 REM REM REM REM REM 
TRADITION -0.292*** 
(-88.69) 
NA NA NA NA 
FRENCH NA 0.069*** 
(9.64) 
NA NA NA 
PROTECTION NA NA -0.042*** 
(-30.57) 
NA NA 
ENFORCEMENT NA NA NA -0.008*** 
(-8.76) 
NA 
OWNERSHIP NA NA NA NA 0.122*** 
(11.63) 
DA -0.016*** 
(-4.09) 
-0.034*** 
(-8.63) 
-0.025*** 
(-6.52) 
-0.036*** 
(-9.13) 
-0.030*** 
(-7.74) 
SIZE 0.066*** 
(112.33) 
0.092*** 
(170.93) 
0.089*** 
(164.46) 
0.092*** 
(170.52) 
0.092*** 
(170.90) 
ROA -0.187*** 
(-35.40) 
-0.202*** 
(-37.02) 
-0.203*** 
(-37.45) 
-0.193*** 
(-35.54) 
-0.203*** 
(-37.24) 
GROWTH -0.117*** 
(-26.38) 
-0.149*** 
(-32.68) 
-0.141*** 
(-31.04) 
-0.150*** 
(-33.02) 
-0.150*** 
(-32.88) 
LEV 0.057*** 
(10.32) 
0.055*** 
(9.61) 
0.061*** 
(10.82) 
0.064*** 
(11.32) 
0.058*** 
(10.30) 
TIME -0.009*** 
(-19.07) 
-0.006*** 
(-11.85) 
-0.007*** 
(-14.57) 
-0.005*** 
(-10.07) 
-0.006*** 
(-13.17) 
ΔGDP -1.621*** 
(-43.88) 
-1.253*** 
(-33.36) 
-1.501*** 
(-39.16) 
-0.987*** 
(-19.39) 
-1.451*** 
(-35.92) 
Intercept -0.377*** 
(-47.42) 
-0.760*** 
(-110.30) 
-0.547*** 
(-56.31) 
-0.847*** 
(-68.30) 
-0.777*** 
(-109.59) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.242 0.199 0.204 0.199 0.199 
Total number of observations 135,722 
The coefficient results are generated by running the following regression (4.7): 
REMt = α + β1INSTITUTION + β2DAt +β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt +β7TIMEt 
+β8ΔGDPt + εt 
Where REM is the aggregated real earning management measure by adding up abnormal production, 
abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses. INSTITUTION refers to institutional 
environment measures, including TRADITION, FRENCH, PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT, and 
OWNERSHIP. TRADITION is a dummy variable that equals 0 for countries that belong to the 
code-law tradition and 1 for countries that belong to the common-law tradition. FRENCH is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for countries that belong to the French-civil-law tradition and 0 otherwise. The 
PROTECTION variable is the “anti-director rights” index developed by La Porta et al. (1998). It is an 
aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from 0 to 5. ENFORCEMENT is the 
legal enforcement score, which is measured as the mean score across three legal variables from La 
Porta et al. (1998), including the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, and the corruption 
index. OWNERSHIP is the measure of ownership concentration, which is measured as the medium 
percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately 
owned non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 1998). DA is the discretionary accruals measure calculated 
using the modified Jones model. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. ROA is calculated as income 
before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. GROWTH is the percentage increase in 
sales. LEV is the total liabilities divided by total assets. TIME is a trend variable that is equal to the 
difference between the current year and 1995. ΔGDP is the annual growth rate of GDP for all 
countries collected from World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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5.3.2 Results for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 tests if there is a significant association between firms’ real earnings 
management activities and firms’ future performance. The regression results to test this 
hypothesis using equations 4.8 and 4.9 are reported in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. The negative 
impact of real earnings management on firms’ future performance is shown by the 
negative and significant coefficients for REMQ in all four institutional regressions when 
adjCFOt+1 is the dependent variable. In particular, when adjCFOt+1 is the dependent 
variable, the coefficients on REMQ for the four regressions are -0.016, -0.009, -0.023, 
and -0.010 at the 1 percent significance level for the TRADITION, PROTECTION, 
ENFORCEMENT and OWNERSHIP regressions. The coefficient for REMQ is 
negative and significant for 2 out of 4 of the equations when adjROAt+1 is the dependent 
variable. These results support the first half of Hypothesis 2 and demonstrate the 
negative impact of real earnings management on firms’ future performance and cash 
generating abilities. The results are stronger for firms’ future cash flow than for firm’s 
future ROA.  
Hypothesis 2 also tests if the significant association between REM and firms’ 
future performance is moderated by the institutional environment in which the firms 
operate. As Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 show, the coefficients for INSTITUTION*REMQ 
are insignificant when adjROAt+1 is the dependent variable. This means that there is no 
evidence supporting that institutional environment has an incremental effect on the 
negative association between firms’ future ROA and firms’ real earnings management 
activities.  
As shown in Table 5.8, the positive and significant coefficient for 
TRADITION*REMQ (0.007) when adjCFOt+1 is the dependent variable indicates that 
the negative impacts of real earnings management on firms’ future performance reduces 
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in common-law countries. To be specific, the overall impact of REM on firms’ future 
CFO is the sum of β1 and β3 in Equation 4.8. For common-law countries and code-law 
countries, the REM impact is -0.009 (i.e. 0.007-0.016) and -0.016 (i.e. 0-0.016) 
respectively. It indicates that REM has a stronger value destroying effect in code-law 
countries.  
Also can be seen from Table 5.8, the coefficient for ENFORCEMENT*REMQ is 
0.001 when adjCFOt+1 is the dependent variables and is significant at the 1 percent level. 
The result shows that the negative impact of real earnings management on firms’ future 
performance is moderated by stronger law enforcement in the country. The coefficient 
for OWNERSHIP*REMQ is -0.015 and is significant at the 1 percent level when 
adjCFOt+1 is the dependent variable, providing evidence that the negative impact of 
REM on firms’ future performance is reduced in countries with less concentrated 
ownership. The coefficient for PROTECTION*REMQ is insignificant when adjCFOt+1 
is the dependent variable. This means that shareholder protection has no statistically 
significant impact on the association between REM and firms’ future cash flow.  
Therefore, the regression results provide some evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Real earnings management has a negative impact on firms’ future ROA and cash flow. 
Stronger institutional environment, such as the common-law legal origin, stronger law 
enforcement, and less concentrated ownership, reduce the negative impact of REM on 
firms’ future cash generating abilities. The adjusted R2 for the adjCFOt+1 model is about 
0.380, which is relatively high in empirical accounting studies.  
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Table 5.7: Future ROA and real earnings management 
 adjROAt+1 adjROAt+1 adjROAt+1 adjROAt+1 
REMQ -0.004*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.007** 
(-2.03) 
-0.002 
(-1.45) 
TRADITION -0.021*** 
(-23.58) 
NA NA NA 
PROTECTION NA 0.004*** 
(11.96) 
NA NA 
ENFORCEMENT NA NA 0.003*** 
(14.42) 
NA 
OWNERSHIP NA NA NA -0.005* 
(-1.86) 
TRADITION*REMQ 0.003 
(1.55) 
NA NA NA 
PROTECTION*REMQ NA -0.001 
(-0.77) 
NA NA 
ENFORCEMENT*REMQ NA NA 0.001 
(1.15) 
NA 
OWNERSHIP*REMQ NA NA NA -0.004 
(-0.69) 
SIZE 0.005*** 
(35.47) 
0.004*** 
(28.35) 
0.004*** 
(28.78) 
0.003*** 
(25.92) 
ROA 0.279*** 
(129.29) 
0.229*** 
(143.05) 
0.286*** 
(134.87) 
0.288*** 
(135.75) 
GROWTH 0.002* 
(1.84) 
0.003*** 
(2.86) 
0.004*** 
(3.32) 
0.004*** 
(3.56) 
LEV -0.019*** 
(-13.94) 
-0.018*** 
(-8.38) 
-0.018*** 
(-12.96) 
-0.018*** 
(-13.05) 
TIME -0.001*** 
(-7.81) 
-0.001*** 
(-8.38) 
-0.001*** 
(-7.12) 
-0.001*** 
(-9.21) 
ΔGDP -0.064*** 
(-7.19) 
-0.063*** 
(-7.01) 
0.042*** 
(3.49) 
-0.077*** 
(-8.07) 
Intercept -0.002 
(-1.02) 
-0.018*** 
(-7.38) 
-0.034*** 
(-11.26) 
0.005*** 
(2.69) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.509 0.507 0.507 0.506 
Total number of observations 135,722  
The coefficient results are generated by running the following regression (4.8): 
AdjROAt+1 = α + β1REMQt + β2INSTITUTION + β3REMQ*INSTITUTION + β4SIZEt + β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt 
+ β7LEVt + β8TIMEt + β9ΔGDPt + εt  
Where AdjROA measures the difference between firm-specific ROA and the mean ROA for the same year and 
industry in the firm’s home country. ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total 
assets. REMQ is an indicator variable equal to one if the sum of the residuals from the CFO model, the production 
cost model, and the discretionary model, where CFO and discretionary expenses models are mutiplied by (-1), is in 
the highest quintile, zero otherwise. This indicator variable is constructed for each country. TRADITION is a dummy 
variable that equals 0 for countries that belong to the code-law tradition and 1 for countries that belong to the 
common-law tradition. The PROTECTION variable is the “anti-director rights” index developed by La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from 0 to 5. ENFORCEMENT is the 
legal enforcement score, which is measured as the mean score across three legal variables from La Porta et al. (1998), 
including the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, and the corruption index. OWNERSHIP is the measure 
of ownership concentration, which is measured as the medium percentage of common shares owned by the largest 
three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 1998).SIZE is the natural log 
of total assets. GROWTH is the percentage increase in sales. LEV is the total liabilities divided by total assets. TIME 
is a trend variable equal to the difference between the current year and 1995. ΔGDP is the annual growth rate of GDP 
for all countries collected from World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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Table 5.8: Future CFO and real earnings management 
 adjCFOt+1 adjCFOt+1 adjCFOt+1 adjCFOt+1 
REMQ -0.016*** 
(-14.63) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.023*** 
(-6.91) 
-0.010*** 
(-6.22) 
TRADITION -0.036*** 
(-39.47) 
NA NA NA 
PROTECTION NA 0.008*** 
(21.84) 
NA NA 
ENFORCEMENT NA NA 0.006*** 
(24.12) 
NA 
OWNERSHIP NA NA NA -0.043*** 
(-16.03) 
TRADITION*REMQ 0.007*** 
(3.99) 
NA NA NA 
PROTECTION*REMQ NA -0.001 
(-1.34) 
NA NA 
ENFORCEMENT*REMQ NA NA 0.001*** 
(3.08) 
NA 
OWNERSHIP*REMQ NA NA NA -0.015*** 
(-2.57) 
SIZE 0.006*** 
(38.92) 
0.003*** 
(24.91) 
0.003*** 
(25.27) 
0.002*** 
(18.40) 
ROA 0.151*** 
(118.55) 
0.177*** 
(120.15) 
0.224*** 
(154.87) 
0.228*** 
(156.81) 
GROWTH 0.008*** 
(7.66) 
0.009*** 
(9.22) 
0.011*** 
(10.10) 
0.011*** 
(10.61) 
LEV -0.008*** 
(-6.17) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.99) 
TIME -0.002*** 
(-16.49) 
-0.002*** 
(-17.20) 
-0.002*** 
(-15.19) 
-0.002*** 
(-16.80) 
ΔGDP -0.090*** 
(-10.11) 
-0.085*** 
(-9.39) 
0.091*** 
(7.60) 
-0.060*** 
(-6.29) 
Intercept 0.017*** 
(10.44) 
-0.013*** 
(-5.53) 
-0.037*** 
(-12.39) 
0.033*** 
(19.37) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.384 0.380 0.380 0.378 
Total number of observations 135,722  
The coefficient results are generated by running the following regression (4.9): 
adjCFOt+1=α + β1REMQt + β2INSTITUTION + β3REMQ*INSTITUTION + β4SIZEt +β5AdjROAt + β6GROWTHt + 
β7LEVt +β8TIME + β9ΔGDPt+ εt   
Where AdjCFO measures the difference between firm-specific CFO and the mean CFO for the same year and 
industry for that country. CFO is cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets.  REMQ is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the sum of the residuals from the CFO model, the production cost model, and the 
discretionary model, where CFO and discretionary expenses models are mutiplied by (-1), is in the highest quintile, 
zero otherwise. TRADITION is a dummy variable that equals 0 for countries that belong to the code-law tradition 
and 1 for countries that belong to the common-law tradition. The PROTECTION variable is the “anti-director rights” 
index developed by La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from 
0 to 5. ENFORCEMENT is the legal enforcement score, which is measured as the mean score across three legal 
variables from La Porta et al. (1998). OWNERSHIP is the measure of ownership concentration, which is measured as 
the medium percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned 
non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 1998). SIZE is the natural log of total assets. ROA is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. GROWTH is the percentage increase in sales. LEV is the total 
liabilities divided by total assets. TIME is a trend variable equal to the difference between the current year and 1995. 
ΔGDP is the annual growth rate of GDP for all countries.  
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5.3.3 Results for research question 3 
Table 5.9 reports regression results for testing firms’ real earnings management 
behaviour in the period of financial crisis, which is examined in Hypothesis 3A using 
equation 4.10. The negative and significant coefficients for CRISIS (-0.063) when REM 
is the dependent variable indicate that firms engage in less real earnings management 
activities during crisis to boost reported earnings controlling for differences in DA, 
SIZE, ROA, GROWTH, LEV, and TIME. This result supports the Big Bath hypothesis 
that firms may take advantage of favourable changes in crises and save the earnings for 
future periods. In terms of the control variables, the coefficient results for DA, SIZE, 
ROA, GROWTH, LEV, TIME and ΔGDP, are significant and consistent with the results 
from Hypothesis 1. 
The regression results when ABCFO, ABDISEXP, and ABPROD are used as the 
dependent variables (equations 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13) are reported in Table 5.10. There is 
a significant association between CRISIS and ABCFO (0.038), ABDISEXP (0.071) and 
ABPROD (-0.165), all of which are significant at the 1 percent level. Namely, there is 
evidence that in crises, firms engage in sales manipulation and reduction of 
discretionary expenses to increase reported earnings. However, firms’ production is at 
an abnormally lower level in crisis, which reduces reported earnings. This is either 
consistent with the Big Bath hypothesis or with the efficiency proposition such that 
firms may face liquidity issues as well as stronger incentives to accumulate cash to 
safeguard against future investment needs (Almeida et al., 2004; Arslan et al., 2006). 
Hypothesis 3B states that there is a significant association between REM and firms’ 
future performance and this association is moderated by crisis. The results testing 
Hypothesis 3B using equation 4.14 are shown in Table 5.11. The findings of Hypothesis 
3B can provide more information to further investigate if the findings of Hypothesis 
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3Areflect firms’ earnings management incentives or normal managerial decision 
making. 
As Table 5.11 shows, there is a significantly negative relationship between CRISIS 
and the two future performance measures as shown by the coefficient of -0.025 and 
-0.022, both of which are significant at the 1 percent level. Firms perform relatively less 
well in crisis periods than in non-crisis periods as firms experience reduced future return 
as well as cash flows. Consistent with the results from Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, the 
negative impacts of REM on firms’ future ROA and CFO are shown in Table 5.11. The 
coefficient for REM is -0.039 when adjROAt+1 is the dependent variable and -0.050 
when adjCFOt+1 is the dependent variable, both significant at the 1 percent level. The 
adjusted R
2
 for models testing Hypothesis 3 are slightly lower than the R
2
 of the models 
in Hypothesis 1 and 2.  
To test the incremental effect of a crisis on the negative impacts of REM on firms’ 
future performance, the coefficients for CRISIS*REM are 0.006 when adjROAt+1 is the 
dependent variable and 0.011 when adjCFOt+1 is the dependent variable. Both 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. This result shows that the negative 
impact of REM on future performance reduces in the period of a crisis. This provides 
some supports for the efficiency hypothesis that the abnormal cash flow, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs in the period of crises may 
reflect the normal course of managerial decision making of managers to cope with 
specific challenges in crisis periods. Although overall real earnings management has a 
negative impact on firms’ future performance, this negative impact reduces in crises 
periods.  
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Table 5.9: Real earnings management and crisis 
 REM 
CRISIS -0.063*** 
(-11.20) 
DA -0.037*** 
(-9.37) 
SIZE 0.091*** 
(171.02) 
ROA -0.195*** 
(-35.99) 
GROWTH -0.149*** 
(-32.77) 
LEV 0.062*** 
(10.98) 
TIME -0.003*** 
(-6.28) 
ΔGDP -1.634*** 
(-33.36) 
Intercept -0.759*** 
(-110.27) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.199 
Total number of observations 135,722 
The coefficient results are generated by running the following regression (4.10): 
REMt = α+ β1CRISIS + β2DAt + β3SIZEt + β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt +β7TIMEt + β8ΔGDPt + εt  
Where REM is the aggregated real earning management measure by adding up abnormal production, 
abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses. CRISIS is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 
crisis period and 0 otherwise. Crisis period is identified by the negative annual GDP growth for a 
particular year using GDP data from World Bank and IMF. DA is the discretionary accruals measure 
calculated using the modified Jones model. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. ROA is calculated as 
income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. GROWTH is the percentage increase 
in sales. LEV is the total liabilities divided by total assets. TIME is a trend variable equal to the 
difference between the current year and 1995. ΔGDP is the annual growth rate of GDP for all countries 
collected from World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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Table 5.10: Subcategories of real earnings management, crisis and institutional 
environment 
 ABCFO ABDISEXP ABPROD 
CRISIS 0.038*** 
(16.94) 
0.071*** 
(20.38) 
-0.165*** 
(-39.76) 
DA -0.011*** 
(-7.23) 
0.015*** 
(6.25) 
-0.031*** 
(-10.88) 
SIZE -0.016*** 
(-65.53) 
0.025*** 
(77.03) 
0.083*** 
(212.64) 
ROA -0.176*** 
(-71.92) 
0.126*** 
(37.69) 
-0.177*** 
(-44.33) 
GROWTH -0.014*** 
(-7.74) 
-0.080*** 
(-28.33) 
-0.071*** 
(-21.15) 
LEV 0.075*** 
(29.59) 
-0.066*** 
(-18.88) 
0.060*** 
(14.38) 
TIME -0.001*** 
(-6.02) 
-0.004*** 
(-13.55) 
0.001*** 
(3.44) 
ΔGDP -0.195*** 
(-10.13) 
2.094*** 
(69.23) 
-3.459*** 
(-95.94) 
Intercept 0.080*** 
(29.50) 
-0.4132*** 
(-96.87) 
-0.440*** 
(-86.78) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.118 0.109 0.303 
Total number of observations 135,722 
The coefficient results are generated by running the following regressions (4.11, 4.12, and 4.13): 
ABCFOt= α + β1CRISIS +β2DAt+β3SIZEt+ β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt+β7TIMEt + β8ΔGDPt 
+ εt  
ABDISEXPt= α + β1CRISIS +β2DAt+β3SIZEt+ β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt+β7TIMEt + 
β8ΔGDPt + εt 
ABPRODt= α + β1CRISIS +β2DAt+β3SIZEt+ β4ROAt + β5GROWTHt +β6LEVt+β7TIMEt + 
β8ΔGDPt + εt 
Where ABCFO is abnormal CFO times -1, ABDISEXP is abnormal discretionary expenses times 
-1 and ABPROD is abnormal production. These variables are developed based on methods from 
prior literature, such as Roychowdhury (2006). CRISIS is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 
crisis period and 0 otherwise. Crisis period is identified by the negative annual GDP growth for a 
particular year using GDP data from World Bank and IMF. DA is the discretionary accruals 
measure calculated using the modified Jones model. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. ROA is 
calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. GROWTH is the 
percentage increase in sales. LEV is the total liabilities divided by total assets. TIME is a trend 
variable equal to the difference between the current year and 1995. ΔGDP is the annual growth rate 
of GDP for all countries collected from World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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Table 5.11: The impacts of real earnings management on future performance in 
crises periods 
 adjROAt+1 adjCFOt+1 
REM -0.039*** 
(-44.35) 
-0.050*** 
(-61.93) 
CRISIS -0.025*** 
(-14.74) 
-0.022*** 
(-14.06) 
CRISIS*REM 0.006*** 
(3.63) 
0.011*** 
(6.73) 
SIZE 0.012*** 
(67.01) 
0.011*** 
(67.37) 
ROA 0.221*** 
(138.31) 
0.168*** 
(114.26) 
GROWTH 0.028*** 
(20.63) 
0.027*** 
(21.83) 
LEV -0.107*** 
(-64.47) 
-0.075*** 
(-49.28) 
TIME -0.002*** 
(-11.05) 
-0.003*** 
(-18.63) 
ΔGDP -0.569*** 
(-39.36) 
-0.540*** 
(-40.76) 
Intercept 0.013*** 
(6.11) 
0.017*** 
(8.52) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.225 0.184 
Total number of observations 135,722 
The above coefficient results are generated by running the following regression (4.14): 
AdjROAt+1 or AdjCFOt+1 = α + β1REMt + β2CRISIS + β3CRISIS*REM+ β4SIZEt +β5AdjROAt + 
β6GROWTH + β7 LEV+β8TIME + β9ΔGDPt + εt 
AdjROA measures the difference between firm-specific ROA and the mean ROA for the same year 
and industry in the firm’s home country. ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items 
divided by lagged total assets. AdjCFO measures the difference between firm-specific CFO and the 
mean CFO for the same year and industry for that country. CFO is cash flow from operations divided 
by lagged total assets. REM is the aggregated real earning management measure by adding up 
abnormal production, abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses. CRISIS is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 for crisis period and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural log of total asset. 
GROWTH is the percentage increase in sales. LEV is the total liabilities divided by total assets. 
TIME is a trend variable equal to the difference between the current year and 1995. ΔGDP is the 
annual growth rate of GDP for all countries collected from World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
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5.4 Additional tests 
This section presents the results on additional tests that use a sample using only 
manufacturing firms, a sample that does not include data from China, and a REM2 
measure to capture real earnings management activities. These additional tests are 
conducted in response to several concerns addressed in Chapter 4 Research Method as 
well as in descriptive statistic discussions.  
5.4.1 Testing a sample without data points from China 
The La Porta et al. studies do not provide measures for institutional environment 
for China. This thesis employs the institutional variables for China developed by Allen 
et al. (2005). In order to alleviate the concern that the differences in the measurements 
for institutional environment in China used in the research process may affect the results, 
additional tests are conducted using a sample without the data from China. The sample 
for this additional test contains 123,082 firm-year observations. All estimation models 
for Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are regressed using this sample. The results are discussed 
below but are not tabulated.  
 The results utilising a sample without China are consistent with the main test 
results using data points from all 31 countries. The coefficient results are -0.329 for 
TRADITION, 0.072 for FRENCH, -0.041 for PROTECTION, 0.018 for 
ENFORCEMENT, and 0.140 for OWNERSHIP, significant at the 1 percent level for 
equation 4.7. These results show that firms engage in more real earnings management to 
boost earning in countries with a code-law tradition, a French legal tradition, weaker 
shareholder protection, stronger enforcement, and more concentrated ownership. The 
results are consistent from the main results testing Hypothesis 1 except the association 
between enforcement and real earnings management activities.  
The results of the additional test investigating the impact of real earnings 
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management on firms’ future performance show a significantly negative relationship 
between REM and future ROA and between REM and future CFO at the 1 percent level 
for all institutional variable regressions. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The 
results of the interaction term REM*INSTITUTION are also consistent with the main 
test results reported in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8.  
In addition, the negative and significant coefficient for CRISIS when REM is the 
dependent variable indicates that there are fewer real earnings management activities in 
crises. These results are consistent with the main test results for Hypothesis 3A. The 
results for regression testing Hypothesis 3B show a negative and significant association 
between future ROA and REM (-0.039). Nevertheless, consistent with the main test 
results, this negative impact of REM on firms’ future ROA is moderated by crisis as 
shown by the positive and significant coefficient (0.006) for the interaction term 
between CRISIS and REM. Similar results are found for adjusted future cash flow. All 
results are significant at the 1 percent significance level.  
These additional results are consistent with the main test result and show that the 
use of Allen et al.’s (2005) institutional measures for China does not influence the test 
results for this thesis.  
5.4.2 Testing a sample using only manufacturing firms 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the observations of Chile, Mexico and Pakistan are 
100 percent from manufacturing industries, which include firms with SIC from 2000 to 
3999 inclusively. A number of countries, such as Denmark, Indonesia, Switzerland, and 
Taiwan also had a considerably high proportion of manufacturing firms. To alleviate the 
concern that the differences in industry composition and the large proportion of 
manufacturing firms may drive the regression analysis results in this thesis, an 
additional test is conducted with a sample that comprises only manufacturing firms (SIC 
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2000-3999 inclusively). The sample for this additional test includes 81,154 firm-year 
observations. All estimation models for Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are regressed using this 
sample. Again the results are discussed but not tabulated.  
The results for the additional tests with only the data from the manufacturing 
industries for the 31 countries over the sample period of 1996 to 2011 are generally 
consistent with the main test results using the full sample. In particular, real earnings 
management is higher in French code-law countries (0.077***) and countries with 
weaker shareholder protection (-0.041***), weaker law enforcement (-0.002*), and 
stronger ownership concentration (0.174***). The results on the association between 
legal tradition and real earnings management activities are, however, inconsistent with 
the main test results showing a positive and significant coefficient of 0.241 for equation 
4.7. This again may be related to the criticism of the simplicity and power of legal 
tradition (code-law versus common-law) as the proxy for the legal regime and 
institutional environment in a country.  
The results for the impacts of real earnings management on firms’ future 
performance using only data from the manufacturing industries are consistent with the 
main test results for Hypothesis 2 using the full sample. The results show that real 
earnings management activities have a negative relationship with firms’ future ROA and 
cash flow and this relationship is moderated by stronger shareholder protection and law 
enforcement.  
In terms of real earnings management during crises, the results are generally 
consistent with the main test results using the full sample. The results support 
Hypothesis 3A that there is a significant relationship between REM and CRISIS. 
However, the sign for the coefficient is positive (0.041***) indicating that there are 
more real earnings management activities to boost earnings in crisis period for 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
90 
 
manufacturing firms. The results for testing Hypothesis 3B are consistent with the main 
test results with a negative and positive coefficient of -0.042 for REM when adjROA is 
the dependent variable and -0.052 for REM when adjCFO is the dependent variable. 
And the coefficient for CRISIS*REM are positive and significant at the 1 percent level 
for both regressions indicating that the negative impact of REM on firms’ future 
performance and cash flow is moderated in the period of crises, consistent with main 
test results for Hypothesis 3B.  
Therefore, the results of this additional test demonstrate that the differences in 
industry composition and the large proportion of manufacturing firms in the sample do 
not change the results reported in this thesis.  
5.4.3 Testing a sample using REM2 
Roychowdhury (2006) claims that the impact of real earnings manipulation on the 
directions of abnormal cash flows is ambiguous. While reducing discretionary expenses 
increase cash flows price discount, channel stuffing and overproduction decreases cash 
flows (Zang, 2012). Therefore, based on Zang (2012), REM2 is developed to measure 
overproduction and reducing of discretionary expenses to boost earnings. This measure 
is the sum of ABPROD and ABDISEXP multiplied by -1. Since this measure is largely 
similar to REM, the results using REM2 are discussed in this additional test.  
The results for the additional tests with REM2 instead of REM for the 31 countries 
over the sample period of 1996 to 2011 are generally consistent with the main test 
results using the full sample. In particular, real earnings management is higher in 
code-law countries (-0.313***), French code-law countries (0.117***) and countries 
with weaker shareholder protection (-0.061***) and stronger ownership concentration 
(0.290***). These results are consistent with the main test results testing Hypothesis 1 
using the REM variable. 
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In terms of testing Hypothesis 2, using REM2 to measure earnings management, 
the results show a negative association between REM2 and future ROA (-0.018) and a 
negative association between REM2 and future cash flow, both significant at the 1 
percent level. These results are consistent with the main test results and provide support 
for Hypothesis 2.  
The models for testing Hypothesis 3 are tested again using REM2 and the results 
show a negative and significant association between REM2 and CRISIS (-0.096***). 
These results are consistent with the main test results and provide support for 
Hypothesis 3A. The additional tests for regression 4.14 and for Hypothesis 3B show a 
negative relationship between REM2 and future ROA (-0.016***) and between REM2 
and future cash flows (-0.025***). Consistent with the main test results, these results 
support the view that real earnings management activities have negative impact on firms’ 
future performance and cash generating ability. However, the coefficients of the 
interaction term of a crisis*REM are negative and significant both when adjROAt+1 and 
adjCFOt+1 are the dependent variable. This indicates that the negative effects of real 
earnings management through reducing discretionary expenses and overproduction on 
future performance are even more serious during crisis periods.  
Overall, the additional test results using REM2 instead of REM are consistent with 
the main test results testing the three hypotheses, except the incremental effect of a 
crisis on the negative association between REM and firms’ future performance. 
5.5 Summary of findings 
This chapter discusses the descriptive statistics, univariate analysis results, 
multivariate analysis results and results of additional tests.  
Hypothesis 1 is supported and the results of multivariate analysis show that firms 
engage in more income-increasing real earnings management in countries with a 
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code-law tradition, a French-civil-law tradition, lower investor protection, lower law 
enforcement, and countries with more concentrated ownership. 
Hypothesis 2 is supported and the results show a significant negative association 
between firms’ real earnings management activities and firms’ future ROA and future 
CFO. The results also show that this negative impact of REM on firms’ future 
performance is moderated by stronger institutional environment.  
Hypothesis 3 is supported and the test results show a negative association between 
REM and CRISIS. The results in terms of the sub-components of REM show that in 
crises, firms engage in sales manipulation and reduction of discretionary expenses to 
increase reported earnings. The results of hypothesis 3 also show that the negative 
impact of REM on firms’ future ROA and future CFO reduces during crises.  
To address some of the issues with research design and the samples and to enhance 
the robustness of the results, a number of additional tests are reported. The results of 
additional tests using a sample that includes only manufacturing firms, a sample that 
excludes China, and using the REM2 measure are generally consistent with the main 
test results.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Hypotheses of the thesis 
Real earnings management has attracted increasing attention in the field of 
accounting research in recent years, especially after a number of changes in the 
regulatory environment, such as the passage of SOX in the U.S.. Extant literature has 
tested different techniques of real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
managers’ choices between accrual-based and real earnings management techniques 
(Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), the consequences of real earnings management 
(Gunny, 2010), institutional environment and earnings management (La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000; Leuz et al. (2003), and evidence on accrual-based 
earnings management and crisis (Lim & Matolcsy, 1999; Navissi, 1999; Chia et al., 
2007; Habib et al. 2013). However, many topics in relation to real earnings 
management are still very lightly tested and much of the existing evidence on real 
earnings management is inconsistent and conflicts to some extent.  
Based on a review of the literature and motivated by the gaps in the literature, 
three hypotheses are tested in this thesis. The first hypothesis tests the association 
between firms’ real earnings management behaviours and country-level institutional 
environment. The second hypothesis tests the association between real earnings 
management and firms’ future performance. The third hypothesis considers the crisis 
context and tests if earnings management behaviours and the impact of earnings 
management change in crisis periods.  
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6.2 Data and results 
The final sample of the thesis consists of 135,722 firm-year observations and 
20,968 unique firms for 31 countries from 1996 to 2011. The thesis adopts the 
modified Jones (1991) model to compute discretionary accruals, which serves as a 
proxy for accrual-based earnings management. Real earnings management activities 
are measured using abnormal CFO, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs, which are computed following Roychowdhury (2006). The earnings 
management models are estimated by every year and industry for every country based 
on the one-digit SIC code. And the data is winsorised at the 5 percent and 95 percent 
level to eliminate potential outliers. The multivariate analysis models are conducted 
for each hypothesis controlling DA, SIZE, ROA, GROWTH, LEV, TIME, and 
changes in GDP. 
In terms of the results, the results provide support for all three hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis tests if firms’ real earnings management activities differ in different 
institutional environment. The findings of Hypothesis 1A, 1B, and 1C show that firms 
engage in more income-increasing real earnings management in countries with a 
code-law tradition, a French-civil-law tradition, lower investor protection, lower law 
enforcement, and countries with more concentrated ownership. These results are 
consistent with prior literature, such as La Porta et al. (1998), Leuz et al. (2003), Defond 
et al. (2007), and Cahan et al. (2008), that firms in countries with weak investor 
protections are more like to engage in income manipulation for opportunistic reasons 
and to acquire more private control benefit, contributing to lower earnings quality in 
these countries. The results for Hypothesis 1 provide important additional results and 
contribute to the earnings management literature by finding significant results in terms 
of firms’ real earnings manipulation behaviours.  
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Hypothesis 2 tests the association between firms’ real earnings management 
activities and firms’ future ROA and future CFO. The regression results provide some 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 that there is a significantly negative association 
between real earnings management and firms’ future ROA and future CFO. The results 
in Hypothesis 2 also show that the stronger institutional environment, such as the 
common-law legal origin, stronger law enforcement, and less concentrated ownership, 
reduce the negative impact of REM on firms’ future cash generating abilities. 
Hypothesis 3 results firstly show a negative association between REM and CRISIS, 
providing support to the Big Bath perspective of firms’ earnings management choices 
during crises. The results on the sub-components of REM show that in crises, firms 
engage in sales manipulation and reduction of discretionary expenses to increase 
reported earnings. However, firms’ production is at an abnormally lower level in crisis, 
which reduces reported earnings. The second part of Hypothesis 3 report evidence that 
the negative impacts of REM on firms’ future ROA and future CFO reduces during 
crises.  
6.3 Implications of the results 
The results documented in this thesis have important implications for regulators 
and investors. Firstly, the results on the association between institutional environment 
and firms’ earnings management behaviours highlight the importance of strong legal 
regime, shareholder protection and law enforcement in reducing opportunistic reporting 
activities. Hypothesis 1 results show that firms engage in more real earnings 
management to boost earnings in countries with weak legal regimes. In addition, the 
results of Hypothesis 2 show that stronger institutional environment reduces the 
negative impacts of REM on firms’ future performance and cash generating abilities. 
These findings emphasise the importance of enhancing shareholder protection laws and 
CHATPER 6: CONCLUSION 
96 
 
regulation and enhancing enforcement by government and oversight bodies to reduce 
insiders’ power to gain private control of benefits, to limit value destroying earnings 
management practices, to enhance accounting reporting practices, and to build a 
stronger financial market. Enhancing shareholder protection regulations and 
enforcement is also important to protect the country from economic and financial 
changes (Beck et al., 2003). The harmonisation of international accounting standards 
and the increasing political and regulatory influences and connections between countries 
may contribute to the enhancing of legal regimes in some countries. As claimed by 
Armour et al. (2009) civil-law systems, which are considered to have weaker 
shareholder protection and law enforcement than common-law countries, are catching 
up with their counterparts in the common-law systems over time. The results also have 
implications for investors that they need to be aware that there exists difference in firms’ 
earnings management behaviours and the quality of accounting information in different 
institutional environment.  
Secondly, the results on the negative association between REM and firms’ future 
ROA and CFO have important implications for regulators. These results show the costs 
of real earnings management activities and call for regulatory attention to develop 
policies that specifically address or limit such behaviours. However, the recent changes 
in accounting regulations, such as the passage of SOX in the U.S., focus mainly on 
reducing opportunistic use of accruals. And as stated in Cohen et al. (2008), the passage 
of SOX may not have effectively reduced earnings management but may have 
motivated firms to engage in real earnings management instead of manipulating 
accruals. The negative and significant coefficients of DA when REM is the dependent 
variable in the regression results also provide some support for the view that firms use 
real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes. 
Therefore, the results of this thesis call for the attention of the oversight bodies, such as 
CHATPER 6: CONCLUSION 
97 
 
the SEC, to reconsider the ability of the current accounting and reporting regulations in 
limiting different forms of earnings management activities, not only accrual-based 
earnings management.  
Thirdly, the results in terms of firms’ real earnings management activities during 
crisis provide valuable implications for regulators. The results of Hypothesis 3 support 
the Big Bath perspective that firms may take advantage of favourable changes in crises 
and save earnings for future periods, as shown by the negative association between 
REM and CRISIS. In addition, the results of Hypothesis 3 serve to support the 
efficiency perspective, as the negative impacts of firms’ real earnings management 
behaviours on future performance reduces in crises. These results imply that firms’ 
incentives for earnings management may have changed during specific crisis period 
possibly because there is less scrutiny and external demand for good performance. Poor 
performance is considered as more acceptable in crisis and firms face less pressure from 
the external market, leading to less opportunistic earnings management and moderated 
negative impacts of earnings management on firms’ future performance. The regulatory 
implications based on these can be extended to non-crisis time periods such that 
regulators can consider how to form regulations that create a healthier external market 
that whilst motivating performances of firms also serves to control firms’ ability or 
incentive to engage in opportunistic earnings manipulations.  
6.4 Limitations 
The limitations of the research design are discussed in Chapter 4. It is firstly 
difficult to disentangle firms’ real earnings management behaviour from the normal 
course of managerial decision making. Managers’ real earnings management activities 
may be their rational responses to economic circumstances (Roychowdhury, 2006). The 
findings on the association between REM and firms’ future ROA and CFO provide 
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some implications for coping with this limitation. The negative association between 
REM and firms’ future performance reported in Hypothesis 2 results provide 
implications that real earnings management reported in this thesis is opportunistic 
because it has a negative impact on firms’ future performance. However, this 
opportunistic behaviour reduces in crises period based on findings of Hypothesis 3.  
Secondly, there can be the problem of endogeneity, which is again difficult to 
address in social science studies. The regression models include a number of important 
control variables, including DA, ROA, SIZE, GROWTH, LEV, TIME, and changes in 
GDP. However, like many other social science studies, which do not have a natural 
experimental setting, there may exist other extraneous variables which have significant 
impacts on the associations tested in the hypotheses.  
6.5 Future research areas 
Based on the findings and limitations discussed above, this thesis calls for future 
research to form a stronger theoretical explanation for firms’ real earnings management 
in different contexts, especially in different business cycles. In addition, this thesis calls 
for future research to test more topics related to real earnings management, such as the 
switch between real and accrual-based earnings management and other techniques of 
real earnings management apart from sales manipulation, management of discretionary 
expenses, and overproduction. Future research can also work to identify extraneous 
variables that may affect firms’ real earnings management behaviours in order to 
enhance the power of tests.  
International studies in the future can update the institutional variables developed 
by La Porta et al. (1998) by using more recent data from more countries to form 
stronger measures to evaluate the institutional environment of different countries today. 
Institutional variables can be developed for countries, such as Russia, that are not 
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included in La Porta et al. (1998) and the subsequent studies.  
Moreover, the additional test using a sample of manufacturing firms only presents 
result that there is a significantly positive relationship between REM and CRISIS, 
indicating that there are more real earnings management activities to boost earnings in 
crises for manufacturing firms. This result is inconsistent with the main test results 
using the full sample. Future research, therefore, can investigate the specific real 
earnings management behaviours of manufacturing firms, which have a large real 
operation component and may have different incentive to engage in accrual-based and 
real earnings management. 
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GLOSSARY 
Variable name Definition 
REM 
 
The sum of the abnormal CFO (ABCFO), abnormal production 
cost (ABPROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABDISEXP), where ABCFO and ABDISEXP are multiplied by 
(-1) to present higher real earnings management when the REM 
measure increases. 
REMQ An indicator variable that equal to one if the sum of the residuals 
from the CFO model, the production cost model, and the 
discretionary model, where CFO and discretionary expenses 
models are multiplied by (-1), is in the highest quintile, zero 
otherwise. This indicator variable is constructed for each country. 
DA Discretionary accruals measure calculated using the modified 
Jones model 
TA Total accruals as calculated as the earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations minus the operating cash flows  
A Total asset  
S Sales/Turnover  
PPE The gross property, plant and equipment. 
AR Accounts receivable 
NA Normal accruals 
COGS Cost of goods sold  
CFO Cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets. 
PROD Production costs, calculated as the sum of COGS and changes in 
inventory during the period 
DISEXP Discretionary expense, calculated as the sum of R&D expenses 
and SG&A. As long as SGA costs are available, R&D expenses 
are set to zero if they are missing.  
ABCFO Abnormal CFO calculated based on methods from prior 
literature, such as Roychowdhury (2006) 
ABDISEXP Abnormal discretionary expenses calculated based on methods 
from prior literature, such as Roychowdhury (2006) 
ABPROD Abnormal production costs calculated based on methods from 
prior literature, such as Roychowdhury (2006) 
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TRADITION A dummy variable that equals 0 for countries that belong to the 
code-law tradition and 1 for countries that belong to the 
common-law tradition 
PROTECTION The “anti-director rights” index developed by La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights 
and ranges from 0 to 5 
ENFORCEMENT The legal enforcement score, which is measured as the mean 
score across three legal variables from La Porta et al. (1998), 
including the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, 
and the corruption index 
OWNERSHIP The measure of ownership concentration, which is measured as 
the medium percentage of common shares owned by the largest 
three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned 
non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 1998) 
SIZE The natural log of total assets 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets 
GROWTH The percentage increase in sales 
LEV The total liabilities divided by total assets 
ΔGDP The annual growth rate of GDP for all countries collected from 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
CRISIS A dummy variable that is equal to 1 for crisis period and 0 
otherwise. Crisis period is identified by the negative annual GDP 
growth for a particular year using GDP data from World Bank 
and IMF 
TIME A trend variable equal to the difference between the current year 
and 1995 
AdjROA The difference between firm-specific ROA and the mean ROA 
for the same year and industry in the firm’s home country 
AdjCFO The difference between firm-specific CFO and the mean CFO for 
the same year and industry for that country 
Fraction of Mfg 
firms 
The fraction of manufacturing firms with SIC from 2000 to 3999 
inclusively 
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